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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Research problem  
Economic development is always of a major concern for researchers as well as for the 
policy makers of this world. Savings and productive capital formation are regarded 
important sources for growth in the theoretical literature, and empirical studies indicate 
the steady–state impacts of savings on capital formation, investment and growth.1 
Finding answers to questions relating to savings and capital formation such as (i) what 
are the determinants of savings (ii) how to increase the resources available for 
productive capital formation and (iii) how productive capital formation is affected by 
internal and external factors, has always been a challenge for researchers. This 
dissertation will focus on the above issues in three specific directions. At first, we will 
examine household savings and productive capital formation with the exposure to 
negative shocks. Differences in household behavior towards their savings and 
productive capital formation can be affected by internal and external factors and with a 
narrow scope we investigate these differences under the influence of the social network 
and the insurance system. Second, the focus will be on the channels and the usage of 
financial institutions that the households employ for their monetary savings. Deposits in 
saving mechanisms are considered a source for investment and we will seek to answer 
whether household choices regarding the usage of different saving mechanisms, such as 
cash hoarding, informal saving intermediaries, and formal saving intermediaries are 
affected by their precautionary saving motive and given insurance coverage. Third, we 
will examine how entrepreneurial capital is formed. In the literature, entrepreneurship 
                                                 
1 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Robelo (1991), Blomstrom et al. (1996), Chow (1993), Coen and Hickman (1980), 
Denison (1980), Eisner (1980), Papanek (1973), Singh (2010) 
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plays an important role, and fostering entrepreneurship is the key to economic growth, 
innovations and market development in developed, transitional, and developing 
economies (Aidis, 2005). Furthermore, entrepreneurship is shown to be a crucial source 
of innovative potential and job formation (Johnson and Loveman, 1995). The formation 
of entrepreneurial capital will be investigated in two dimensions: physical capital and 
human capital, and the growth of these two dimensions, under the influence of the 
institutional environment and the entrepreneur’s education, will be the main theme of 
this step.  
This research on savings and capital formation will contribute to the literature. We 
empirically investigate the case of Vietnam and considered it an interesting example for 
developing economies in general.  
As a South-East Asian country, Vietnam is located favorably to connect with the world 
economy. After the unification of North and South in 1975, Vietnam continued being a 
centrally planned economy, which is, in restrospective, considered the main reason for 
the economic stagnation. The turning point in the modern economic history of Vietnam 
was 1986 when the government launched the doi moi, or “the innovation program”. 
With the implementation of the program, the private sector was allowed to take part in 
entrepreneurship. The establishment and development of private enterprises was 
permitted and the household business was clearly defined regarding its legal, 
organizational, and operational status. The results were remarkable. The 1990 real GDP 
was about 20 billion USD (constant 2005 USD), and this figure doubled until 2000. 
Until 2010, it had increased to nearly 80 billion USD. In 2010 the GDP per capita (PPP, 
constant 2005 international USD) reached USD 3,000, three times higher than that in 
1990. Other economic indicators such as the GDP growth rate, the life expectancy, the 
poverty rate, etc. improved sharply. The innovation program has liberated the economy, 
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and private entrepreneurship, which contributes to the development process, became 
possible. In 1990, there were only about 100 private enterprises and some 850,000 
household enterprises were in operation. These numbers increased to 100,000 private 
firms and more than 2.4 million household businesses in 2000. The private sector 
accounted for 90% of newly created jobs and contributed 42% of GDP, about 3% more 
than the share of the state sector. In 2011, the number of enterprises reached the mark of 
320,000 establishments, of which 96% were private enterprises, 1% were state-owned 
enterprises, and the rest were foreign companies. Most employment was found in the 
private sector (61%); 22% and 15% of jobs were offered by foreign and state 
enterprises, respectively.2 The significant changes of the economy and the components 
of households and entrepreneurship motivate our researches on household saving 
behavior as well as on firm performance in Vietnam. In this dissertation, we will try to 
find answers to the research question, which is generally stated as: Which factors 
determine savings and capital formation in a developing economy like Vietnam? 
First, we focus on households, which are considered the smallest cells of the economy. 
Here we investigate household savings and productive capital formation.  
The relation between savings and growth of a nation’s income has been largely 
discussed in the literature. As a share of national savings, household savings contribute 
to investment, which in turn promotes economic growth (Chow, 1993; Blomstrom et al., 
1996). Studying household saving behavior is of great interest for researchers in this 
area. On the macro level, savings are considered a nationwide and aggregated variable 
and it is investigated how it interacts with other macro factors such as human capital, 
fixed capital, technological issues, or institutional factors. On the micro level, household 
saving behavior has been investigated largely and often exclusively in developed and 
                                                 
2 GSO (2012), World bank data (2013)  
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transitional economies due to data availability. Studies are based on three main 
approaches towards the traditional theories of savings. These approaches are expressed 
by the disposable income hypothesis, the permanent income hypothesis, and the life-
cycle hypothesis. Theoretically, households save for many reasons such as, precaution, 
retirement, interests, future expenditure, sense of independence, business, bequest, etc. 
Among saving motives, the precautionary motive is considered highly important in 
developing economies as the national insurance system is underdeveloped and does not 
cover the whole population. Most empirical studies focus on the determinants of 
household savings. Two categories of determining factors are the household head’s 
characteristics and the household’s characteristics. Within the household’s 
characteristics, the most frequent-used explanatory variable is wealth and/or income 
(Ramanathan, 1968; Horika and Wan, 2007; Newman et al., 2007). A positive 
relationship between the saving rate and wealth and/or income was found. Other 
variables are family size (Newman et al., 2007), income source (Kelly and Williamson, 
1968; Pailwar et al., 2010), dependency ratio (Kelly and Williamson, 1968; Kraay, 
2000; Pailwar et al., 2010), or location of the household (Kelly and Williamson, 1968). 
Within the household head’s characteristics, education of the household head appeared 
frequently as an explanatory variable in studies and it yielded either contradicting 
results (Kelly and Williamson, 1968) or no effect could be proven (Newman et al., 
2007, Pailwar et al., 2010). Other characteristics of the household head used are age, 
gender, the status of membership of a social network, etc.3 Aside from these factors, the 
social environment and government assistance, which receive little attention by 
researchers, can be used as substitutes for insurances. This is the first motivation for our 
study on household savings. The second motivation is that most studies so far employ 
                                                 
3 See Kelly and Williamson (1968), Orbeta (2006), Newman et al. (2008), Kraay (2000), Pailwar et al. (2010), etc 
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the saving rate as the dependent variable. No study looks explicitly at both, liquid assets 
and productive capital formation as dependent variables. Resulting from these two 
motivations, we will, in the first part, investigate the role the social network and 
insurance play and how they affect household saving behavior and productive capital 
formation in rural Vietnam. The general research question motivating this part of the 
research concentrates on the role of social network and insurance. It can be formulated 
as follows: Do social networks and insurance impact on household savings and 
productive capital formation in rural Vietnam? 
Then, continuing with the issue of household savings, in the next part we focus on the 
saving mechanisms which households can employ to store their savings according to 
their different saving motives.  
Household saving behavior is also distinguished by different household decisions 
regarding which saving mechanism to employ. While in developed economies savings 
are to a large extent stored in the financial system, household savings in developing 
countries are largely stored at home. The high rate of cash hoarding may result in 
adverse impacts on economic development. The selection of where to store savings can 
vary from hoarding over formal financial institutions to informal financial 
intermediaries. In developing economies, chances to access to the formal financial 
system are not equally distributed among the population. Low-income households face 
many barriers on the way to access formal financial intermediaries such as complicated 
and unclear procedures, travelling cost to institutions, impersonal and unfriendly 
service, or high opening balance requirements and minimum deposits (ILO, 2007). So, 
low-income households tend to save money and substitutes as e.g. jewelry, at home 
rather than depositing to financial intermediaries. They do this, even though cash 
hoarding is insecure and does not yield any returns (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).  
6 
 
As mentioned above, in developing economies the precautionary motive is considered 
to be dominant in case the household income is low and fluctuating. This motive 
requires highly liquid savings. Cash hoarding fulfils this liquidity requirements 
perfectly. The implementation of an insurance system can decrease household 
vulnerability towards risks and uncertainty and insurance can serve as a substitute for 
precautionary savings (Hubbard et al., 1994; 1995; Kotlikoff, 1979; Chou et al., 2003; 
2004). However, the selection between cash hoarding or financial intermediaries seems 
to attract only minor attention in the literature and little empirical research in this field 
has been conducted so far.  Carpenter and Jensen (2002) examine the household 
selection of saving mechanisms (banks and bisi) in Pakistan. Household income was 
found to have a positive effect on the probability to deposit savings in banks and also 
numeracy and literacy resulted to be important determinants. Other variables such as the 
number of female adults, the occupation and the location of households (in urban or 
rural areas) can affect household decisions regarding how and where to save. Newman 
et al. (2012) formulate a model on the basis of the study by Fafchmps et al. (1998). By 
means of this model they examine the role the social network plays in determining 
household savings. Using panel data constructed from household surveys in 2006, 2008 
and 2010 in Vietnam, they found out that the membership of a high quality network has 
a positive and significant impact on the saving level of households. In detail, the 
participation of a high quality network can foster savings in formal financial 
intermediaries and cash hoarding. However, the membership of a high quality network 
has a negative marginal effect on savings in informal saving intermediaries. The study 
also found that the participation in a low quality network has no effect on household 
saving levels in all cases.  
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In order to contribute to this string of literature, our second paper will seek to answer 
the research question: Do the short-term precautionary motive and insurance influence 
the selection among different saving mechanisms available to rural Vietnamese 
households?  
This empirical study will examine the effects that the short-term precautionary motive 
and insurance have on household decisions in two dimensions: the probability to join 
financial institutions as a client and the total amount of money that households deposit 
to financial institutions.  
Last but not least, the process of capital formation through entrepreneurship, which is 
running parallel with savings and capital formation in households, will be examined. 
The influence the institutional environment and the human capital of the entrepreneur 
have on this process will be focused on. 
The capital that is formed through entrepreneurship is a) physical capital and b) human 
capital. The growth of these types of capital (firm growth) is at the core of the 
development process and is a main concern for policy makers. Gibrat’s Law of 
Proportion Effect (LPE) is considered the seminal contribution within firm dynamic 
theories. It defines that the growth of firms is a randomly distributed model. 
Researchers found that this law does not hold in case many factors determine the growth 
of firms. When investigating micro and small firms in southern Africa, McPherson 
(1996) finds that firm size and firm age negatively affect firm growth. Other factors 
influencing firm growth can be sector, location, and socio-economic variables. Mead 
and Liedholm (1998) use data of micro and small firms in Dominica and five African 
countries (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe) and find that firm 
age, firm size and female entrepreneurs have negative effects on firm growth. The study 
of Biesebroeck (2005) finds superior performance of large firms in the manufacturing 
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sector in sub-Saharan African countries and that the aggregate productivity growth is 
largely dependent on the performance of large firms.  
Externalities can affect the capital formation of firms. Such factors can be infrastructure,  
nature and the enforcement of business regulations, property rights, and the openness of 
public resources. All are considered important determinants of firm growth (Aterido et 
al., 2011). Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) also find that firm size and firm age 
negatively affect firm growth. They define obstacles of firm growth such as regulatory 
barriers, market constraints, infrastructure, and financial constraints. The study of 
Fisman and Svensson (2007) investigates the role of bribery payments and taxes on firm 
growth. These two environmental factors are found to have negative impacts on firm 
growth. The study finds that the negative influence of corruption is more severe to firm 
performance than that of taxation. Corruption is also considered an obstacle to firm 
growth in the work of Honorati and Mengistae (2007). They study the growth of small-
scale manufacturing firms in India. In this study, they state four institutional factors 
including corruption, labor regulation, access to finance, and the quality of the power 
supply as obstacles to business operations and growth. Using a large sample of 1,500 
firms, Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) emphasize the importance of the investment 
climate for firm performance in China. They find that the technological infrastructure, 
the governmental regulatory burden, and corruption have a major influence on firm 
growth. Other institutional obstacles to firm growth can be defined as power outages 
and customs delays (Dollar et al., 2005).  
The scarcity of firm data may be the major reason for the limited amount of literature on 
firm growth in Vietnam. In one study, Hansen et al. (2009) use 300 incumbent firms, 
whose corresponding data comes from three overlapping surveys which have been 
conducted between 1990 and 2000. They investigate the impacts of government 
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assistance and other interactions with the state sector on the long-term performance of 
small and medium sized manufacturing enterprises (SME) in Vietnam. They find that 
firm characteristics such as size, ownership, and location determine the growth of firms. 
Receiving initial government assistance or being a firm which counts the state sector as 
a customer have positive impacts on firm growth.  
Few studies have concentrated on impacts of human capital on firm growth and the 
results seem to be inconclusive. McPherson (1996) finds that human capital has a 
positive relationship with firm growth. However, two other studies (Hansen et al.,2009; 
and Tuan and Yoshi, 2009) yield different conclusions, namely that augmented human 
capital of entrepreneurs has no impact on firm growth. 
In this part, we will answer the research question relating to the impact the business 
environment and human capital have on firm capital formation. It is stated as follows: 
Do institutional factors and the human capital of the entrepreneur affect capital 
formation through entrepreneurship in Vietnam? 
1.2. Research focus, design, and major results 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are as follows:  
In chapter 2 or the first paper, we investigate the role of the social network nexus and 
the insurance nexus in determining household savings and productive capital formation 
in stocks and flows in rural Vietnam. We, therefore, look at more than monetary 
savings. We consider the ways of forming productive capital and the asset structure in 
terms of both, flows and stocks. There are two pillars in this research. The first pillar is 
monetary savings, which fulfills the need to hold a highly liquid and flexible asset, and 
the second pillar is real productive capital formation in rural households. In each pillar, 
we investigate the impacts of the two nexuses on household savings and productive 
capital formation. The first nexus is the social network and the assistance, which 
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composes the strength of a household’s social network and support system, membership 
in organizations, and assistance in the shape of visits from consultants (professional 
workers employed by the government). The second nexus is the insurance nexus 
(availability and affordability of insurance). These two aspects are examined under the 
influence of negative shocks, which are the major concern of rural households. Basing 
on the exposure to negative shocks, rural households are classified into “ex ante” 
(without negative shocks) and “ex post” (with negative shocks) groups.  
This paper uses data from a household survey of rural areas in Vietnam, namely 
VARHS08 (Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey: Characteristics of the 
Vietnamese Rural Economy, 2008 Survey). The dataset contains a sample of 3,227 
households in rural Vietnam. With the plane of cross-sectional data, the linear 
instrumental-variables estimation is employed for the quantitative analysis. This paper 
takes into account the endogeneity of all concerned variables of the social network 
nexus and the insurance nexus. Post-estimation tests have been done to ensure that 
results are consistent.  
With regard to stocks, we found that the role of the supporter variable is more important 
than the roles of organization and assistance variables. The number of supporters 
positively relates to liquid assets but it has negative impacts on the rate of productive 
assets in both “ex ante” and “ex post” households. While membership of an 
organization has no impact on capital formation, the number of non-demanded visits 
(assistance) has impacts in “ex ante” households and no impacts in “ex post” 
households. The analysis shows that the social network nexus works in “ex ante” 
households rather than in “ex post” households. The insurance works as a precautionary 
method when we consider the liquid assets of households, and the results are identical in 
both “ex ante” and “ex post” households: Households with insurance accumulate a 
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smaller portion of monetary assets compared to those without insurance. The results 
robustly indicate that there is a strong, positive, and significant relationship between 
insurance and household productive assets. After comparing the two nexuses, we can 
conclude that the insurance nexus seems to be dominant in comparison with the social 
network nexus in both household groups: “ex ante” and “ex post”. 
With regard to flows, the role of the social network nexus is significant in case of the 
government assistance as this variable has negative impacts on “ex ante” households. 
The number of supporters and membership of organizations seems to have little impacts 
on household savings and productive capital formation. The study confirms the 
precautionary view, stating that joining an insurance scheme will reduce the rates of 
both, liquid savings and productive capital of households. Insurance is found to have 
statistically significant impacts in all cases except for the flow of productive assets. 
When comparing the role of both nexus, the results indicate that the insurance nexus is 
also dominant in household savings and productive asset formation in both groups: “ex 
ante” and “ex post”.  
Chapter three will present the second paper, which focuses on the impact of the short-
term precautionary motive and insurance on household selection of saving mechanisms 
in rural Vietnam. Using the same dataset as for the first paper, this study quantitatively 
examines the theme under two dimensions: the probability of households to join saving 
intermediaries, and the contribution of households to saving intermediaries. In order to 
answer the respective research question, we focus on four hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis in this part (hypothesis 3.1) states that households primarily motivated to 
save for short-term precautionary reasons have a higher probability to save at home. The 
second hypothesis (hypothesis 3.2) proposes that insurance serves as a substitute for the 
short-term precautionary motive. In other words, the number of insurance contracts that 
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a household signed and holds will increase the probability of that household to deposit 
money to saving intermediaries. The third hypothesis (hypothesis 3.3) assumes negative 
impacts of the short-term precautionary motive on household contributions to saving 
intermediaries. The last hypothesis in this chapter (hypothesis 3.4) proposes that a 
higher number of insurance contracts will lead to a bigger amount of savings that a 
household deposits to saving intermediaries.  
Because the dependent variable contains a left-censored value of zero, the Tobit model 
is normally used for estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). However, we use the two-
part model instead as the Tobit model often faces the weaknesses of normality and 
heteroskedasticity. The first part of the two-part model is a binary outcome model, 
which estimates the probability of household participation to formal and informal 
saving intermediaries. The second part is a linear model, which estimates the household 
contribution to formal and informal saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. In the 
second part, we use both the normal OLS and the linear IV estimations.  
The dataset contains 1432 households which have monetary savings either in the form 
of cash hoarding or in the form of deposits in saving intermediaries. 86.3% of 
households exert cash hoarding as the main mechanism of their monetary savings. The 
difference between formal and informal participants is not significant. Savings motives 
are classified into the short-term precautionary motive (around 44% of total households) 
and the long-term motive (around 56% of total households). 
The impact of the short-term precautionary motive is proven in the first part of the 
econometric model. The results indicate that the short-term precautionary motive may 
generally reduce the probability of households to deposit to saving intermediaries in 
rural Vietnam. In the formal and informal groups, the coefficients of the short-term 
motive are negative and significant. The estimation results have confirmed hypothesis 
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3.1 on the role the short-term precautionary motive plays for household selections 
regarding saving mechanisms in rural Vietnam. The first part of our two-part model also 
responds to hypothesis 3.2. The more types of insurance households signed and hold, 
the higher the probability of being a client of saving intermediaries. This result is 
consistent with the precautionary view, stating that the precautionary selection will be 
reduced if an insurance system is implemented. The second part of the two-part model 
tests the last two hypotheses. This sub-model is a combination of OLS and linear IV 
estimations. The significance levels of the two concerned variables are lower as 
compared to the case where the participation probability is tested. Hypothesis 3.3 is 
confirmed partially since the short-term precautionary motive is found to have negative 
impacts within formal participants, but not having any statistical effects within informal 
particpants and when considering all participants. Refering to hypothesis 3.4, no 
evidence for any impact of the insurance variable on the contribution of households to 
saving intermediaries can be found.  
In chapter four, we consider capital formation in enterprises. Firm growth as a specific 
case of firm capital formation is of an interest here. In this chapter, we investigate the 
impacts of the institutional environment and the entrepreneur’s education on firm 
growth in Vietnam. Deriving the idea from the theoretical work of Gries and Naude 
(2011), we form two hyphotheses, which help to answer the respective research 
question. The first one (hypothesis 4.1) states that higher levels of institutional factors 
will associate with positive growth of firms in the region. The second hypothesis 
(hypothesis 4.2) connects the role of the entrepreneur’s education with firm growth, as it 
states that higher levels of the entrepreneur’s education will result in higher growth rates 
of firms. We use two datasets to examine these issues. The data comes from four main 
sources. The first one is the annual enterprise census by the GSO, which provides data 
14 
 
at the firm level and which surveys 100% of registered enterprises in Vietnam. The 
second source is the province-level data from the GSO website. The third one is 
institutional indicator data coming from the VCCI. The World Bank website is the last 
source, which provides the GDP deflator to calculate the real growth rate of firm capital. 
The first dataset is a balanced panel with 37,788 enterprises spanning from 2006 to 
2009. The second dataset, which consists of 38,293 enterprises, is also a balanced panel 
with two points of time (2008 and 2009). 
The growth rate of firms is considered in two dimensions: employment growth and 
capital growth. The capital growth is calculated in real values. Within each growth 
dimension, enterprises classified by the three sectors, agriculture, industry and service, 
will be analyzed. The average growth rate of employment offered by firms is around 
10%. Firms operating in the industrial sector experienced the highest growth rates. The 
real growth rate of firm capital is much higher with 20% per year on average. Service 
firms experienced the highest growth among all sectors. Compared to other developing 
economies, the rate of entrepreneurs with a university degree is relatively high in 
Vietnam, accounting for around 72% of total entrepreneurs.  
The dynamic model is employed with the advantage that panel data can control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity within the analysis of firm growth. Since the OLS model 
could yield inconsistent results in the presence of endogeneity, we employ the system 
GMM for the panel dataset, and the lagged differences of endogenous variables are 
included as instruments in different additional moments. When testing hypothesis 4.1, 
we use nine indicators as proxies for the institutional environment. The results confirm 
empirically that land access, time costs, informal charges, and business support service 
relate positively to firm growth. That means that higher levels of these institutional 
indicators will foster the growth of firms. The findings indicate an interesting result,sss 
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namely that the impacts of institutional factors are dissimilar between employment 
growth and capital growth as more significant results are found regarding the capital 
growth of firms.  
Our hypothesis 4.2 is partly proven by the empirical evidence. Unlike other studies, 
which found no statistically significant evidence of educational effects on firm growth, 
we find significant impacts of the entrepreneur’s education on firm growth in some 
cases. The positive coefficients of the entrepreneur’s education imply that enterprises 
whose entrepreneurs hold a bachelor degree or a more respected title, will experience 
higher growth rates than those firms with entrepreneurs holding a title below the 
bachelor level. Education has larger impacts on the growth of employment than on the 
growth of capital. Entrepreneurial education is found to have impacts on employment 
growth of agricultural and service firms as well as on capital growth within service 
firms. Education does not affect growth rates of industrial firms, neither employment, 
nor capital growth. Also do capital growth rates of agricultural firms not respond to 
entrepreneurial education.  
Finally, Chapter 5 provides some concluding remarks for the dissertation. 
  
16 
 
2. HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS AND PRODUCTIVE 
CAPITAL FORMATION IN RURAL 
VIETNAM: INSURANCE VS. SOCIAL 
NETWORK 
 
This chapter is based on the paper “Household savings and productive capital 
formation in rural Vietnam: insurance and social network” by Gries, T. and Ha, V. D. 
The paper has been accepted and will be publicized in The Modern Economy (ME). 
One of its earlier version was presented at the 6
th
 RGS Doctoral Conference in 
Economics (February 26-28, 2013 at the Ruhr University Bochum). 
 
2.1. Introduction 
At the macro level, a major problem in economic development is how to increase the 
resources available for productive capital formation since productive capital formation 
and investment have a strong relationship with growth.4 Hence, the allocation of 
resources between present and future consumption (savings) is one of the most 
fundamental economic choices in any economy. 
Resources earmarked for investment and economic growth can be increased through 
more domestic savings. Household savings is one important part of investment.5 In 
developing economies, liquid and productive capital formation not only serves 
economic growth but can also be used for other purposes such as the precautionary 
                                                 
4 Papanek (1973), Coen and Hickman (1980), Denison (1980), Eisner (1980), Chow (1993), Blomstrom et al. (1996)  
5 Hyun et al. (1979), Bellone (2008), Ang (2009), Brahmasrene and Jiranyakul (2009), Herwartz and Xu (2009), Esso 
and Keho (2010)  
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motive, the life cycle motive, the inter-temporal substitution motive, or the bequest 
motive.6 Because the financial market in rural areas is imperfect, these motives may 
lead to a differentiated saving behavior. Households allocate their capital in a way that 
fits in best with their respective motives. Unlike in developed economies, where people 
can put their savings into stocks and many other financial assets and where this large 
variety of financial assets can serve many purposes, people in developing economies 
have no access to this variety of assets with different purposes. These households often 
keep their short-term savings in the form of liquid assets such as gold, jewelry, or cash 
(at home and/or short-term deposits at financial institutions). Household savings with a 
longer-term perspective are invested in real productive assets such as land, cattle, or 
durables. The precautionary motive is especially important for households with no 
access to a formal social welfare system; indeed, most of these households are in rural 
areas. The main source of rural income is agriculture, which is strongly affected by 
adverse conditions such as diseases, pests, fires, and bad weather. Furthermore, 
agricultural price variability can lead to income fluctuations for the farmers. These 
income shocks can be effectively compensated by household savings.7 Another type of 
negative shock relating to household members such as illness, death, or divorce can 
affect household savings.8 
We are motivated by two main considerations. First, most studies in the existing 
literature, that investigate household savings use the savings rate, defined as the ratio of 
monetary savings (or liquid assets) to disposable income, as the dependent variable. No 
study looks explicitly at asset formation or at a large variety of assets for productive 
capital formation. What is more, no study looks simultaneously at liquid assets and 
productive capital formation options in rural households in developing countries. 
                                                 
6 Browning and Lusardi (1996) 
7 Modena and Gilbert (2012) 
8 Ersado et al. (2003), Filippo and Luigi (2012) 
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Neither is there a study that examines both flows and stocks of savings and productive 
capital formation. Looking at the issue from a time dimension perspective, flows are 
defined as short-run (within one year) changes of the total balances of liquid and 
productive capital while stocks are defined as capital that has been accumulated over the 
long-run. Studies that investigate long-run asset accumulation are more relevant since 
they can provide a general picture of household behavior during the whole lifetime of 
respective households. However, the investigation of household behavior in flows can 
be a subordinate of stocks as the results in flows can provide a picture of the considered 
household behavior during one period. 
Second, when examining household savings, researchers focus on two main categories 
of saving determinants: household’s characteristics and household head’s 
characteristics.9 However, the literature pays little attention to institutional conditions, 
the natural and social environment, and government assistance.  
Therefore, in this study we look at more than monetary savings. We include other ways 
of forming productive capital as well as the asset structure in terms of both flows and 
stocks. We look at monetary savings as the first pillar of asset composition, which 
fulfills the need to hold a highly liquid and flexible asset, and at real productive capital 
formation, the second pillar of asset accumulation in rural households. We investigate 
the important roles of the social network and the assistance nexus (strength of a 
household’s social network and support system, membership in organizations, and 
assistance in the shape of visits from consultants (professional workers employed by the 
government)), as well as the impact of the insurance nexus (availability and 
affordability of insurance) on household savings and productive capital formation. 
Finally, we study these two aspects in connection with the effects of being exposed to 
                                                 
9
 Kelly and Williamson (1968), Ramanathan (1968), Kraay (2000), Paxton (2001), Denizer et al. (2002), Seguino and 
Floro (2003), Ersado et al. (2003), Orbeta (2006), Horika and Wan (2007), Kulikov et al. (2007), Newman et al. 
(2007), Pailwar et al. (2010),  Feng et al. (2011) 
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negative shocks. 
Vietnam is an interesting case to study since it has experienced strong economic growth 
since the late 1980s. Before that, Vietnam was one of the poorest countries in the world 
with GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international USD) of US$ 803 in 1985 and a 
GDP growth rate of around 4% per year. However, the economy changed after the 
implementation of a series of innovation policies from 1986 onwards (known as ‘Doi 
Moi’).  During the 1990s and 2000s, Vietnam’s average GDP growth rate was 7.5% and 
7.1%, respectively, peaking at 10% in 1995. GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 
international USD) reached US$ 2,611 in 2008, approximately three times that of the 
1985’s figure.10 Even though the process of industrialization and modernization has 
been strongly fostered, most of the population still lives in rural areas (in 2009 rural 
inhabitants accounted for around 70% of total population down from 76% in 2000).11 
Due to its long coastline, Vietnam is sensitive to natural disasters from the sea. The 
country stretches out from north to south with a coastline of over 3,300km and is hit by 
an average of 4 severe storms or typhoons every year. These natural negative shocks are 
amplified by shocks to household members such as disease or death. These shocks are 
always a major concern for the population in rural areas since negative shocks tend to 
absorb a part of the households’ liquid and productive assets. Accordingly, savings in 
the form of liquid assets and productive capital formation for precautionary reasons are 
almost an obligation in Vietnamese households.  
The literature has shown that both social networks and insurance can affect household 
savings12 and that both can be used to compensate for the impacts of negative shocks. 
While social networks are considered a traditional channel in developing economies, its 
                                                 
10 WB (2012) 
11 GSO (2010) 
12
 Hemming and Harvey (1983), Engelnhardt (1996), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Beverly and Sherraden (1999), 
Chou et al. (2003), Ballinger et al. (2004), Giles and Yoo (2007), Maynard and Qiu (2009), and others 
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comparatively modern cousin – the insurance system - seems less developed due to 
scarce economic resources, constraints on the public sector and low institutional 
capacity.13 This raises concerns about impacts of these two factors on household savings 
with respect to negative shocks. The question may be whether the modern scheme – 
insurance – has a greater impact than the traditional one – social networks – on capital 
formation. The answer may have implications for policy makers, whose policies 
concern household savings and productive capital formation in rural Vietnam.  
To test the role of the social network nexus and the insurance nexus, we employ the 
linear instrumental-variables method and account for the endogeneity of all concerned 
variables, an approach that has not been taken before in the field of household savings. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the relevant literature of the 
social network and the insurance nexus. Section III describes the data. Section IV 
provides the statistical methods used in the analysis. Section V discusses the empirical 
results and Section VI gives some conclusions and policy implications.  
2.2. Literature review on the social network nexus and the insurance nexus 
Household connections to social networks can be separated into two main streams. The 
first stream connects households and household members with economic and/or social 
organizations. The research by Pailwar et al. (2010) investigates the impact of 
household members who participate. A membership is said to exist when one household 
member works for a financial institution. Their research finds that membership in 
financial institutions has a significantly positive effect on household savings. Where 
social organizations are concerned, membership in an occupational pension scheme in 
the UK is positively related to savings.14  
                                                 
13 Carrin (2002) 
14
 Hemming and Harvey (1983) 
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The second stream connects households and household members with the community. 
The links between households and the community can be a way for households to obtain 
better supports and/or to reach a higher level of experience. To study how social 
learning can affect the life cycle ‘precautionary savings’ task, Ballinger et al. (2004) use 
experimental methods with subjects, who come from social science classes at the 
University of Houston, participating in one out of three groups. Each group represents a 
different generation. The former generation’s members were observed by the successive 
generation’s members. The results indicate that latter generations can improve their 
ability to solve the life cycle precautionary saving models. The results of Giles and Yoo 
(2007) provide support for the argument. They use household panel data from rural 
China and find that migrant networks that developed from the 1990s onwards have an 
effect on precautionary savings. Households can improve their ability to cope with risk 
as the networks expand. As the size of the village migrant network increases, 
households engage less frequently in precautionary savings. While friends and relatives 
also form parts of social networks,15 their specific influence on household savings or 
productive capital formation has not been investigated.  
Insurance and household savings can be used to pool negative shocks. The risk of 
unstable income or the occurrence of negative shocks can be mitigated by private and 
public insurance, and insurance can be used to complement household savings within 
the framework of such shocks. In a study on Taiwanese micro-data, Chou et al. (2003) 
find a negative relationship between health insurance and household precautionary 
savings. The empirical results suggest that the introduction and expansion of social 
health insurance significantly reduce households’ precautionary savings. Another study 
by Chou et al. (2004) confirms the role of health insurance in reducing households’ 
                                                 
15
 Fafchamps and Lund (2003) 
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precautionary savings in the context of the introduction of Taiwan’s National Health 
Insurance program in 1995. Their findings are consistent with those of other studies on 
the impacts of different types of insurance such as social insurance16, disability 
insurance17, and unemployment insurance18. In two separate studies, Gruber and 
Yelowitz (1999) and Maynard and Qiu (2009) investigate the effect of Medicaid, a 
major social insurance scheme that provides health insurance to low-income individuals 
in the U.S., on household savings. The results suggest that Medicaid has a conclusive 
impact on reducing household savings. However, the study by Starr-MccLuer (1996) 
challenges the precautionary view in that it finds a strong and positive relationship 
between insurance and household wealth.  
The literature has identified the positive role of social networks in motivating household 
savings through organizational membership or a social learning effect. It empirically 
confirms the complementary impacts of insurance on household savings, but not on 
household wealth. However, no study mentions about the effect of direct support from 
the government on household savings. To close the gap in the literature, we add 
government assistance in the form of consultancy services, and friends and relatives as 
components of the social network, and examine their impact on household liquid and 
productive capital formation. Using stocks and flows as separate categories, we can also 
test for the precautionary view of savings in the form of liquid assets and productive 
capital.  
2.3. Data description 
For our analysis we use data from a household survey of rural areas in Vietnam, namely 
VARHS08 (Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey: Characteristics of the 
                                                 
16 Hubbard et al. (1995)  
17 Kantor and Fishback (1996) 
18 Engen and Gruber (2001) 
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Vietnamese Rural Economy, 2008 Survey). This survey was funded by Danida and 
executed by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), in cooperation 
with the University of Copenhagen, the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (IPSARD), and the Institute for Labor Science and Social 
Affairs (ILSSA) in twelve provinces of Vietnam in 2008.19 The data set “was designed 
to provide better and more current information about key factors influencing the 
livelihoods and development opportunities, as well as constraints that characterize the 
economic environment of households in rural Vietnam”.20 Therefore, it was the best 
source of detailed information on the issue this paper seeks to examine. A sample of 
3,227 households, for all of which complete data is available, is used. Most households 
(52.3%) are located in the Northern Midlands – a mountainous area, while less than 1% 
are in the Mekong River delta. The remainders are located in the north central area and 
central highlands. 
In this paper, we distinguish between liquid assets and productive assets (capital) to 
describe household savings and productive capital formation, so we can cover the two 
main categories of asset accumulation and asset holdings. Liquid assets are deposits in 
financial institutions, ROSCAs, private moneylenders, or cash/gold/jewelry kept at 
home. Such assets can be used for the short-term precautionary motive, among others. 
The short-term precautionary motive also reflects the discontinuity of the income and 
expenditure stream. Revenues from agricultural production are random and agricultural 
expenditure is seasonal in nature. Therefore, liquid asset holdings can be expected to 
buffer this mismatch between revenue and expenditure and to smooth the income and 
consumption path. By contrast, productive assets are assets such as productive durable 
goods, cattle, and land that can yield additional income for households. As such, they 
                                                 
19
 http://www.ambhanoi.um.dk/en/menu/AboutUs/News/NewsArchives2009/HouseholdSurvey2008Launched.htm 
20
 VARHS (2006: 1) 
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form part of a wealth growth strategy. They may also serve to ensure the continued 
income and wealth of a household in case it sustains a larger shock. Liquid and 
productive assets add up to total assets (total capital formation). Each household’s asset 
variables, stocks, and flows are related to its disposable income. A stock is a 
household’s asset holdings at the time of the interview. We determine asset ratios for 
the stocks of (i) liquid assets, (ii) productive assets and (iii) total assets. A flow is a 
change in asset holding (asset formation) during the previous twelve months. Hence, for 
the flow variables we obtain (i) a flow liquid asset ratio, which represents a liquid 
savings ratio, (ii) a flow productive asset ratio, and (iii) a total (or an overall) flow ratio. 
All ratios are calculated by dividing their values by the household’s disposable income 
over the previous 12 months. For example, the flow liquid asset ratio represents the flow 
of liquid assets divided by the household’s disposable income (measured in the previous 
12 months).  
Due to the large number of households (58%) that experienced at least one negative 
shock during the previous year, and due to the expected effects of such a negative shock 
on observable asset values, we distinguish between households that sustained such a 
major negative shock and those that did not. For the group of households that did, we 
observe an “ex post” (of shock) situation with respect to precautionary asset holdings. 
For the group that did not experience a negative shock, we observe the “ex ante” (of 
shock) situation that should allow us to identify precautionary asset motives more 
clearly, in particular when comparing households’ behavior to that of the “ex post” 
group. By dividing the households into these different groups we can identify “ex ante” 
of shock and “ex post” of shock decisions before comparing the influence of the social 
network nexus and the insurance nexus in household savings and productive capital 
formation. The variable definitions are described in the Appendix A.1.  
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Table 2.1:  Summary of selected variables 
 (*)(***) indicate that mean differences between “ex ante” and “ex post” households are 
statistically significant at the levels of 10% and 1%, respectively.  
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the major characteristics of the data, broken down 
into three household groups: all households, “ex ante” households and “ex post” 
households. First, among 58% of rural households suffered at least one negative shock 
 All households “ex ante” households “ex post” households 
Variables   Mean S.D.   Mean  S.D.  Mean S.D. 
       
Total flow ratio 0.21 0.77 0.26 0.73 0.18*** 0.80 
Flow liquid asset ratio 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.05*** 0.12 
Flow productive asset ratio 0.14 0.76 0.17 0.71 0.12* 0.79 
Total stock ratio 14.91 37.93 12.24 17.90 16.82*** 47.30 
Stock liquid asset ratio 0.15 0.35 0.19 0.43 0.12*** 0.27 
Stock productive asset ratio 14.76 37.94 12.05 17.92 16.71*** 47.30 
Shock  0.58 0.49     
Household member shocks 0.09 0.28     
Economic/natural shocks 0.54 0.50     
Household head‘s characteristics       
Gender  0.82 0.38 0.80 0.40 0.84 0.37 
Edu2 0.07 0.25 0.09 .028 0.06 0.23 
Edu3 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.09 
Household‘s characteristics       
Person  4.85 2.00 4.53 1.90 5.08 2.03 
Young rate  0.25 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.22 
Old rate 0.18 0.24 0.14 0.28 0.10 0.21 
Social network       
Supporters  1.61 0.98 1.60 0.99 1.62 0.97 
Organization 0.79 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.81 0.39 
Assistance  4.24 5.71 4.13 5.80 4.31 5.65 
Insurance 0.82 0.38 0.78 0.41 0.86 0.35 
Instruments        
Ethnicity  0.62 0.49 0.71 0.46 0.55 0.50 
Area1 0.52 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.59 0.49 
Area2  0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 
Area3  0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.40 
Observations 3227 1352 1875 
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during the previous 12 months, 54% faced one economic or natural disaster, and 9% 
were confronted with negative shocks that originated within the household’s members. 
These surprisingly large numbers show that disasters are an important part of life in 
rural Vietnam. Second, the total flow ratio in rural Vietnam is 21% and hence relatively 
low compared to other countries like China.21 Only one third of the total flow represents 
flow liquid assets, a proportion that is closer to that of some transition economies.22 The 
means of the three flow ratios are statistically different between “ex ante” and “ex post” 
households. Households facing shocks have a lower rate of liquid assets and productive 
capital formation compared to non-shock households.  
Second, for stocks, the average ratio of total assets to net income is around 15 (times), 
indicating relatively high asset accumulation in rural households. Most assets are the 
productive stock of real household assets. Rural households maintain only a small share 
of liquid assets (cash and/or jewelry), preferring instead to invest a large proportion in 
profitable or productive assets such as productive durables, land, and cattle, and do not 
require more flexible and liquid monetary assets. In stocks, the mean differences 
between the two household groups are statistically significant as well. However, the 
means of productive assets and total assets in the “ex post” group are higher than those 
in the “ex ante” group while the mean of liquid assets in the “ex post” group is higher. 
This may indicate a negative impact of shocks on household income in rural areas.  
Third, most households (82.4%) are headed by a male. This figure is comparable to data 
from the Philippines but higher than the figures for Zimbabwe and urban China.23 The 
total dependency rate in the households is 36%, with a young dependency rate of 25% 
                                                 
21 Horioka and Wan (2007), Feng et al. (2011)  
22 Denizer et al. (2002) 
23 Ersado et al. (2003), Orbeta (2006), Feng et al. (2011)  
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(similar to that in urban China, but twelve per cent lower than in rural China) and an old 
dependency rate of 18% (similar to rural and urban China).24 
Fourth, we consider three components of the social network. The average number of 
supporters who can help these households in times of difficulty is over one. This 
variable reflects the existence of close relationships among relatives or friends or 
community members and in turn suggests a functioning social network in rural areas. It 
also indicates an agricultural culture in which households can quite easily call on 
relatives, friends, and members of their community for assistance. Another social 
network variable is membership of organizations in rural areas. More than 70% of 
households have at least one household member who is affiliated with the political or a 
social organization such as the Political party, the Youth union, the Women’s union, or 
with an economic organization such as a business association, a credit/microfinance 
association, a cooperative and so forth. Concerning assistance from local authorities and 
the government, rural households in these areas receive on average four non-demanded 
visits from agricultural consultants (professional workers) each year. These visits, a type 
of government assistance, serve to provide rural households with information and/or 
assistance on farming and livestock raising techniques, and are paid for by the 
government. There is no major difference between the means of “ex ante” and “ex post” 
households in the assistance and supporter variable.  
Fifth, 82% of households have at least one type of insurance. The share of households 
engaging into the insurance system within the “ex post” group is higher than that of the 
“ex ante” group (86% compared to 78%).  
                                                 
24 Horioka and Wan (2007) 
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2.4. Econometric framework 
Because of the plain cross-section data structure, the econometric model used to identify 
the impacts of the social network nexus and the insurance nexus is the linear 
instrumental-variables (IV) model. In OLS estimations, endogeneity may arise when the 
error term is systematically related to the regressors, and thus the OLS estimators are 
inconsistent or cannot be used for a causal interpretation. The IV model, which controls 
for endogeneity is employed with the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method, which can 
yield the most efficient estimators.25 The IV model takes the following form: 
i
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= 11
0 βββ                              (2.1) 
Yi represents the dependent variables including the flow liquid asset ratio, the flow 
productive asset ratio, the total flow ratio, the stock liquid asset ratio, the stock 
productive asset ratio, and the total asset ratio. J, K is the number of endogenous and 
exogenous variables, respectively. Wki denotes the included exogenous variables, which 
are uncorrelated with ui. The six exogenously determined regressors are number of non-
demanded visits measuring for the government assistance, education of household head, 
gender of household head, number of household members, a proxy for household size, 
the young rate, and the old rate of households. The number of non-demanded visits is 
one of our concerned variables, but it is outside the households’ control so we regard it 
as an exogenous factor. While gender of household head is obviously exogenous, we 
regard the rest as exogenous variables.26 Xji denotes the endogenous regressors, which 
potentially correlate with ui. They include household wealth, measured in its natural 
logarithm, number of supporters, membership in social/economic organizations, and 
insurance. While the three latter variables are of interest to us, household wealth is one 
                                                 
25 Cameron and Trivedi (2010) 
26 Kulikov et al. (2007), Maynard and Qiu (2009), Feng et al. (2011), Kedir and Ibrahim (2011)  
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likely endogenous variable and is considered an endogenous control variable. We 
believe that some unobserved factors may contribute to the above endogenous variables, 
thus causing endogeneity in the model. A number of instruments are considered to 
account for the endogeneity of the potentially endogenous variables. The instruments 
(the excluded exogenous variables) comprise the distance between households and all-
weather roads, ethnicity of households, age of household head, and location of 
households (Area1, Area2, and Area3). These instruments can fully or partly affect the 
endogenous regressors. As wealth is considered, the justification could be based on 
most instruments. While age of household head has a strong relationship with household 
wealth,27 distance to all-weather roads and household location can be used to measure 
the invisible value of houses and lots. Real estate close to an all-weather or major road, 
which implies a convenient-transport connection, often has a higher value than 
properties in remote areas or those that are close to a minor road. The higher value of 
real estate near all-weather roads can be due to the fact that these properties can be 
suitable as offices for small businesses or business rentals. The price of land varies 
according to the geographical location. For example, one hectare of agricultural land in 
the Central Highlands, a region that is fertile and suitable for growing high-value crops 
such as rubber, cashews, or peppers, is much more expensive than comparable lots in 
the Northern mountainous area (unfertile one-season rice fields). The breakdown into 
geographical location and ethnicity can reflect a difference in culture and thus influence 
the number of supporters and organizational membership. For example, people in the 
south are said to be more open than those in central areas, so it may be relatively easier 
for people in the south to make friends. Another example is ethnicity. Members of the 
Kinh community may have easier access to organizations as this group accounts for 
                                                 
27 Shorrocks (1975), Mirer (1979), Masson (1986), Jappelli (1999)  
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85.7% of the total population in 2009. The second largest ethnic group – the Tay 
community– accounted for only 1.89%.28 The ethnic origin of households is still 
relatively important in Vietnam, meaning that members of larger Kinh community may 
have better connections and can fall back on stronger networks. Concerning the 
insurance variable, membership of an insurance scheme can be determined by a number 
of factors, including ethnicity and age of the household head29.  
2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. The roles of the social network nexus and the insurance nexus in stocks 
Table 2.2 reports the results of stocks of liquid assets and productive assets including 
the diagnostic tests. The first row presents the three household groups, namely all 
households, “ex ante” households, and “ex post” households. For each household group, 
three estimations with three different dependent variables are presented: total flow ratio, 
flow liquid asset ratio, and flow productive asset ratio. The estimation results are from 
the IV regressions since the Wooldridge’s robust score test and the robust regression F 
test indicate the presence of endogeneity. The Sargan chi2 is a diagnostic test value for 
overindentifying restrictions. 
Five estimations, i.e., (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6) with the superscript “a” use the full set of 
instruments while the others drop the ethnic variable from the set due to overidentifying 
restrictions. The ethnic variable is dropped from the estimations (2), (7), (8), and (9) 
because the diagnostic test of overidentifying restrictions for exogenous instruments is 
not satisfied when the ethnic variable is included as an instrument. 
  
                                                 
28 UNFPA (2011) 
29 Arun et al., (2012) 
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Table 2.2: Regression results for stocks 
all households "ex ante" households "ex post" households 
  (1)a (2) (3)a (4)a (5)a (6)a (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Total stock ratio 
Stock liquid 
asset ratio 
Stock prod. 
asset ratio 
Total stock 
ratio 
Stock liquid 
asset ratio 
Stock prod. 
asset ratio 
Total stock 
ratio 
Stock liquid 
asset ratio 
Stock prod. 
asset ratio 
Constant -221.2*** 1.46*. -222.5*** -218.4*** 0.54 -218.9*** -273.3 3.16 -276.4 
(67.59) (0.84) (67.90) (80.11) (1.161) (80.62) (183.2) (1.97) (184.4) 
Household head's characteristics         
    Gender -3.21 0.05*. -3.25 -5.91* 0.007 -5.92* -2.42 0.08* -2.51 
(2.21) (0.03) (2.23) (3.23) (0.04) (3.25) (3.90) (0.05) (3.93) 
    Edu2 -9.99*** 0.07*. -10.06*** -10.28*** 0.03 -10.31*** -7.65** 0.06 -7.71** 
(2.22) (0.04) (2.24) (3.65) (0.06) (3.68) (3.79) (0.05) (3.84) 
    Edu3 -22.21*** 0.35*** -22.53*** -21.42*** 0.40** -21.82*** -27.49** 0.26* -27.75** 
(4.36)    (0.11) (4.40) (7.31) (0.16) (7.38) (11.28) (0.15) (11.37) 
Household's characteristics         
    LnWealth 17.41*** -0.09 17.49*** 18.01*** -0.02 18.03*** 20.71 -0.22 20.92 
(5.18) (0.06) (5.21) (6.13) (0.09) (6.17) (13.76) (0.15) (13.84) 
    Person -4.19*** 0.02 -4.19*** -4.28*** 0.001 -4.28*** -5.16*** 0.03 -5.19*** 
(0.83) (0.01) (0.83) (1.35) (0.02) (1.36) (1.84) (0.02) (1.85) 
    Young rate 17.25*** -0.01 17.30*** 11.52** 0.05 11.47* 13.05 -0.10 13.15 
(5.23) (0.07) (5.31) (5.85) (0.12) (5.91) (11.67) (0.12) (11.74) 
    Old rate 16.29*** -0.08*         16.36*** 18.08*** -0.08 18.16*** 13.72* -0.10 13.82* 
(3.23) (0.05) (3.25) (4.05) (0.06) (4.07) (7.11) (0.09) (7.17) 
    Supporter -7.77*** 0.15*** -7.88*** -11.98*** 0.18*** -12.15*** -6.12 0.09** -6.21* 
(1.55) (0.03) (1.56) (3.99) (0.06) (4.01) (3.73) (0.04) (3.75) 
    Organization 9.37 -0.14 9.50 23.03 -0.12 23.15 -10.26 -0.07 -10.19 
(8.51) (0.12) (8.55) (14.25) (0.21) (14.34) (15.72) (0.15) (15.80) 
    Assistance  0.28*** -0.003 0.28*** 0.45** -0.002 0.46** 0.31 -0.0009 0.32 
(0.10) (0.002) (0.10) (0.20) (0.003) (0.20) (0.21) (0.002) (0.21) 
    Insurance 52.90*** -0.61*** 53.31*** 38.47*** -0.38** 38.85*** 88.35*** -0.79*** 89.14*** 
(8.53) (0.15) (8.57) (11.89) (0.17) (11.96) (26.86) (0.30) (27.05) 
Diagnostic Tests         
    Wooldridge's robust score test (p-value) 71.6 (0.00) 43.4 (0.00) 72.9 (0.00) 33.2 (0.00) 16.1 (0.00) 34.1 (0.00) 31.3 (0.00) 46.0 (0.00) 31.8 (0.00) 
    Robust regression F test (p-value) 17.9 (0.00) 11.1 (0.00) 18.2 (0.00) 7.8 (0.00) 4.1 (0.00) 8.1 (0.00) 7.8 (0.00) 11.8 (0.00) 7.9 (0.00) 
    Sargan Test chi2 (p-value) 5.50 (0.14) 1.53 (0.47) 5.55 (0.14) 2.98 (0.39) 0.14 (0.99) 2.97 (0.40) 0.91 (0.64) 1.04 (0.60) 0.91 (0.64) 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,875 1,875 1,875 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a employ full set of instruments: Distance, Ethnicity, Lnage, Lnage2, Area1, Area2, and Area3. Others use the set of instruments without Ethnicity.  
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First, we examine controlled independent variables. Gender of household head seems to 
have less impact in both “ex ante” and “ex post” households.30 There is a slight and 
weakly significant difference in stock productive assets in “ex ante” households and 
stock liquid assets in “ex post” households. This may indicate that gender difference of 
household heads is no longer an important factor for decisions regarding the household 
saving behavior in rural Vietnam. The education variable has significant impacts on a 
household’s accumulation of savings and productive capital in rural Vietnam. Higher 
educational attainment on the part of a household’s head indicates larger differences in 
both liquid and productive asset accumulation. However, the effect of the education 
variable indicates a difference in direction between liquid and productive assets. In both 
household groups, households with a head with a vocational training level of education 
or above tend towards a higher liquid asset rate31 while these households have lower 
productive asset ratios, which also determine signs and significance levels of the total 
stock ratios. A higher ratio of liquid assets can be explained by the fact that highly 
educated household heads may have higher incomes32 and thus more resources for 
liquid accumulation. The results for productive assets are robust across groups and 
education levels. Net income may be the main reason behind the negative signs of the 
productive asset ratio. In line with the higher rate of liquid assets, the transformation of 
income to productive assets in households whose heads have higher education may be 
relatively lower than in base households. A greater proportion of net income may be 
used for other purposes such as consumption or liquid assets rather than for 
reinvestment in productive capital.  
                                                 
30 In line with Paxton (2001), Ersado et al. (2003), and Denizer et al. (2002), but in contrast to Seguino and Floro 
(2003), Kulikov et al. (2007), and Feng et al. (2011). 
31 In line with Dynan et al. (2004), Newman et al. (2007), Pailwar et al. (2010), and Feng et al. (2011), but in contrast 
to Denizer et al. (2002) and Kulikov et al. (2007). 
32 Both groups with higher education have a net income that is almost double the net income of the reference group 
(no formal qualifications). 
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Number of household members has consistently negative effects on both household 
groups in terms of their productive asset ratios, yet there is no significant impact on 
liquid assets. More members may need more resources for consumption, so among them 
there may be greater demand for available cash. The dependency rate (young and old) 
seems to have a greater effect on the “ex ante” household group than on the “ex post” 
household group. The results indicate that a higher dependency rate may imply a lower 
level of net income. It is assumed that with a constant level of net income transformed 
into productive assets, households with a lower net income will have a higher rate of 
productive assets (and in turn, a higher total asset ratio).  
Turning to the central question of the study, we investigate the impacts of the social 
network nexus and the insurance nexus on household savings and productive capital 
formation, in relation with the exposure to shocks. Within the social network nexus, the 
role of the supporter variable seems to be more important than those of organization and 
assistance variables. A higher number of supporters can promote liquid assets but 
reduce the rate of productive assets in both “ex ante” and “ex post” households. More 
supporters may mean more help, so a higher number of supporters may reduce the 
significance of the precautionary motive and hence the value of liquid assets. However, 
this is not what we observe. In fact, these households have a higher ratio of liquid 
assets. One explanation could be that these assets reflect a smoothing of consumption 
and income variations, rather than being evidence of precautionary activity because of a 
major threat. In other words, a strong social network represented by number of 
supporters allows households to retain greater liquid assets in order to smooth short-
term smaller fluctuations, including a kind of down-payment motive, such that 
households are put in a position to wait for a better price or sufficient resources before 
acquiring a productive asset.  
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While membership in an organization has no impact on capital formation, the number of 
non-demanded visits (assistance) can increase the productive asset and total asset ratios 
only in “ex ante” households. The result may indicate the effectiveness of the assistance 
scheme in that it enhances the household’s ability to transfer its income into productive 
assets. However, assistance has no effect on capital accumulation in “ex post” 
households.  
The analysis may imply that the social network nexus works in “ex ante” households 
rather than in “ex post” households. This means that social networks seem to have an 
insignificant role when it comes to making households more resilient to shocks. 
The results of the insurance nexus are split into two directions. The precautionary view, 
which is supported in the literature, is held when we consider the liquid assets of 
households. The results are identical in both “ex ante” and “ex post” household groups 
when households with insurance accumulate a smaller portion of monetary assets 
compared to those without insurance. The second direction relates to the statistically 
significant impacts of insurance on productive assets. Our finding confirms the 
argument of Starr-McCluer (1996) that there is a strongly and positively significant 
relationship between insurance and household productive assets. The results are robust 
across households and the accumulation process can be used to explain the strong and 
positive effects of insurance. Households with insurance can increase their ability to 
accumulate productive assets and form stocks. This may also be in accordance with the 
lower rate of liquid assets.  
Compared to the social network nexus, the role of the insurance nexus seems to be 
dominant in both “ex ante” and “ex post” household groups. Insurance may not only 
help households increase their productive capital formation, but also insure households 
against risk.  
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2.5.2. The roles of the social network nexus and the insurance nexus in flows 
A similar method is applied to analyze the flows of household liquid assets and 
productive assets. Five estimations, i.e., (3), (5), (6), (7), and (9) with the superscript “a” 
use the full set of instruments (Distance, Ethnicity, Lnage, Lnage2, Area1, Area2, and 
Area3), while the other estimations exclude the ethnic variable from the set.  
Concerning the social network nexus, number of supporters seems to have an effect only 
on the liquid assets of “ex ante” households. The number of supporters has no impact on 
the “ex post” group. It seems that these households have to deal with the fallout from 
negative shocks themselves. Help from friends and/or relatives does not change their 
liquid and productive asset ratios.  
Organization membership has little effect on liquid assets and no impact on productive 
capital. It can affect households in that it reduces the liquid asset ratio within the “ex 
ante” group, but this effect is not present within the “ex post” households. This means 
that membership does not influence household behavior in case of negative shocks.  
Assistance seems to have a greater impact in the social network nexus. It affects not 
only liquid assets but also productive assets of “ex ante” households. A higher number 
of non-demanded visits may induce these households to spend more on consumption 
rather than liquid or productive assets. Another intuitive explanation could be that the 
visits from agricultural consultants help households to increase their net income and 
when their consumption rises, their liquid and productive capital ratios may fall. Within 
the social network nexus, assistance may be the most important factor affecting, both 
liquid and productive assets. The magnitude of the insurance coefficient is, however 
relatively small.  
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Table 2.3: Regression results for flows 
all households "ex ante" households "ex post" households 
  (1) (2) (3)a (4) (5)a (6)a (7)a (8) (9)a 
VARIABLES 
Total stock 
ratio 
Stock liquid 
asset ratio 
Stock prod. 
asset ratio 
Total stock 
ratio 
Stock liquid 
asset ratio 
Stock prod. 
asset ratio 
Total stock 
ratio 
Stock liquid 
asset ratio 
Stock prod. 
asset ratio 
Constant 4.45** 1.68*** 2.64 5.02 1.69** 3.18 6.84 2.70** 4.59 
(1.99) (0.55) (1.66) (3.30) (0.77) (2.50) (4.42) (1.35) (3.87) 
Household head's characteristics         
    Gender 0.17*** 0.05*** 0.12** 0.20 0.05 0.15 0.15* 0.06* 0.11 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) 
    Edu2 0.12 0.05** 0.06 0.22 0.07* 0.16 0.02 0.03 -0.006 
(0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.20) (0.04) (0.17) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) 
    Edu3 0.48*** 0.19*** 0.26** 0.75*** 0.23*** 0.45** 0.45 0.20** 0.30 
(0.15) (0.05) (0.12) (0.29) (0.09) (0.22) (0.28) (0.09) (0.24) 
Household's characteristics         
    LnWealth -0.28* -0.11*** -0.16 -0.33 -0.12** -0.20 -0.49 -0.19* -0.32 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.13) (0.25) (0.06) (0.19) (0.33) (0.10) (0.29) 
    Person 0.06** 0.02*** 0.03 0.12** 0.03** 0.08* 0.05 0.03** 0.03 
(0.03) (0.008) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
    Young rate -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20 -0.06 -0.23 -0.16 -0.09 -0.04 
(0.17) (0.04) (0.14) (0.28) (0.07) (0.21) (0.29) (0.08) (0.25) 
    Old rate -0.35*** -0.10*** -0.24*** -0.37** -0.09** -0.25** -0.37*** -0.13** -0.26** 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.17) (0.04) (0.12) (0.14) (0.05) (0.12) 
    Supporter 0.08 0.07*** -0.04 0.35** 0.12*** 0.10 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.18) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) 
    Organization -0.26 -0.07 -0.17 -0.72 -0.24* -0.51 -0.20 0.003 -0.21 
(0.23) (0.07) (0.18) (0.55) (0.14) (0.41) (0.32) (0.09) (0.28) 
    Assistance  -0.01*** -0.004*** -0.004* -0.03** -0.005** -0.01* -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0007 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.01) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
    Insurance -1.23*** -0.49*** -0.54** -1.72*** -0.39*** -0.94** -0.76* -0.52*** -0.46 
(0.36) (0.10) (0.22) (0.61) (0.12) (0.41) (0.42) (0.20) (0.35) 
Diagnostic Tests         
    Wooldridge's robust score test (p-value) 27.3 (0.00) 112.7 (0.00) 13.9 (0.00) 19.1 (0.00) 55.1 (0.00) 9.8 (0.04) 24.6 (0.00) 66.4 (0.00) 10.4 (0.03) 
    Robust regression F test (p-value) 7.0 (0.00) 29.6 (0.00) 3.5 (0.00) 4.7 (0.00) 14.1 (0.00) 2.5 (0.04) 6.3 (0.00) 17.4 (0.00) 2.6 (0.03) 
    Sargan Test chi2 (p-value) 2.94 (0.23) 2.34 (0.31) 3.83 (0.28) 1.27 (0.53) 2.20 (0.53) 3.15 (0.39) 2.11 (0.55) 1.10 (0.58) 1.29 (0.73) 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 1,352 1,352 1,352 1,875 1,875 1,875 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a employ full set of instruments: Distance, Ethnicity, Lnage, Lnage2, Area1, Area2, and Area3. Others use the set of instruments without Ethnicity.  
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On the other side - the insurance nexus - the results show that, except for the estimation 
of the flow productive assets, insurance is statistically significant in other estimations. It 
can be said that insurance participation confirms the precautionary view as stated in the 
literature.33 “Ex ante” households that are signed up to insurance schemes have lower 
rates in both flow liquid assets and flow productive assets. Accordingly, they may spend 
more on consumption than on savings in the shape of liquid and productive assets, 
leading to lower ratios in these categories. The findings also reflect the fact that some 
productive assets may function as precautionary assets, so it appears that insurance 
substitutes for the need to save and allows for more consumption. There are hardly any 
observable effects of insurance on households that sustain a shock. However, it seems 
they have more liquid assets if they are insured. The findings concerning insurance in 
rural Vietnam are similar to those in China after the Chinese government increased 
health spendings for rural households.34 In “ex post” households, the insurance variable 
secures the precautionary role in liquid assets only. This may indicate that shocks 
equally affect household productive assets regardless of insurance. One significant 
difference compared to stocks is the signs of the coefficients of productive assets. We 
expect positive effects in both cases, stocks and flows, but the signs turn out to be 
negative in flows. One factor that can affect the different signs is the time dimension. In 
flows, the time period is quite short for households with insurance to accumulate 
enough resources to acquire a high-value productive asset and what is more, they have 
no strong demand for liquid assets. It may be asked “where these households put their 
liquid assets in order to produce a positive effect of productive assets in stocks” The 
answer may be that they do not employ savings mechanisms for their liquid assets, but 
they do take part in the informal credit market. They play the role of private creditors 
                                                 
33 Hubbard et al. (1995), Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), Chou et al. (2003, 2004, 2006), Maynard and Qiu (2009) 
34 Barnett and Brooks (2010) 
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who lend their monetary savings, which in this case are not accounted in liquid assets, 
thus leading to a smaller rate of liquid assets. In stocks, the accumulation process 
happens over a long time and these households can regain their credits back and 
transform their liquid assets plus credits into productive assets, yielding the positive 
signs of productive assets in flows.   
The above analysis indicates that in flows the insurance nexus is also dominant in 
household savings and productive asset formation in both “ex ante” and “ex post” 
groups. Within the “ex ante” group, social networks have an impact on liquid assets and 
minor effects on productive assets, while insurance has a relatively larger effect on 
household behavior in both categories. Within the “ex post” group, insurance has an 
impact on liquid assets, whereas social networks make no difference.  
2.6. Conclusions and policy implications 
To sum up, the social network nexus and the insurance nexus are shown to play a 
significant role in household savings and productive capital formation. Using the IV 
estimation, we identify that in stocks or in the long-term, the role of social networks is 
inconclusive in “ex ante” households while we find no relationship between social 
networks and household savings and asset formation in “ex post” households. The 
insurance variable seems to have a greater impact as it affects both liquid and 
productive assets in both household groups. While liquid assets still follow the 
precautionary argument, productive assets are found to have a positive relationship with 
insurance. In flows or in the short-term, social networks support the precautionary view 
of “ex ante” households while insurance is shown to play a role in both “ex ante” and 
“ex post” household groups. In conclusion, the insurance nexus is dominant compared 
to the social network nexus when it comes to determining household savings and 
productive capital formation in rural Vietnam.  
39 
 
The analysis also produces some policy implications. First, governmental assistance has 
a positive effect on household savings in the short-term in that it reduces the liquid 
savings while increasing productive asset accumulation in the long-term. Technical 
assistance may be important for farming processes and thus can raise the agricultural 
output of rural households. Technical assistance cannot alone create higher income for 
rural households. In addition to an increase in output, a price policy should be 
implemented to guarantee a stable income from agriculture. The price policy is 
important since for many years, agricultural producers have often faced a cycle 
involving: low prices plus high output or low output plus high prices.  
Second, the role of insurance is identified and shown to be more important than the 
traditional method (social networks) in influencing the precautionary motive of savings. 
Participating in an insurance scheme can help rural households to cope with the 
occurrence of negative shocks. Promoting insurance participation may be one way to 
encourage productive asset accumulation, which can yield additional value, and produce 
additional assets that can then be reinvested in the economy. 
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3. SHORT-TERM PRECAUTION, INSURANCE 
AND SAVING MECHANISMS IN RURAL 
VIETNAM 
This chapter is based on the paper “Short-term precaution, insurance and saving 
mechanisms in rural Vietnam” by Ha, V. D. It has been published within the Working 
Paper Series by the Center for International Economics of the University of Paderborn. 
3.1. Introduction 
The decision to save in the form of either cash hoarding or in form of deposits in 
financial intermediaries may be important for researchers since households in 
developing economies tend to save in cash at home rather than to deposit savings to 
financial intermediaries (Stix, 2012). This trend in saving decisions can potentially lead 
to adverse impacts on economic development (Lervine and Zervos, 1998). However, the 
literature seems to pay little attention to this field and therefore we conduct this study to 
find out whether the household short-term precautionary motive and insurance affect 
household participation and contribution to savings intermediaries.  
Vietnam is an interesting case to study. During the last three decades, Vietnam was one 
of the fastest growing economies. As a result, the demand for capital increased, leading 
to a more active role of the financial system which has also undergone dramatic changes 
in both, quantity - and quality – aspects. This is especially true when we speak of rural 
areas. During 2007 and 2008, the economy faced high interest rates, reflecting a high 
demand for liquidity. At the peak in mid-2008, the nominal deposit interest rate in some 
financial institutions reached 19% per year (SBV, 2008). This indicates a shortage of 
liquidity in the economy. However, the main objective of Vietnam was to control the 
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inflation in this period as it reached 22.1% that year (WB, 2013). In accordance with the 
current fiscal policy, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) applied a contractionary policy 
and the supply of liquidity from the SBV was reduced by increasing the prime lending 
rate from 6.5% in January to 15% in June, 2008. Additionally, the access of commercial 
banks and other financial institutions to credits from the SBV was restricted because 
most commercial banks and financial institutions cannot provide enough collateral for 
their borrowings (SBV, 2011). As the concerned financial service providers were 
without access to the tertiary market (SBV) they were left with two options to access 
cash in order to counter balance any scarcity of liquidity. These options were the 
primary market (individuals and organizations) and the secondary market (other 
commercial banks and financial institutions). The access of financial institutions to the 
secondary market (interbank market) was also difficult as the overnight interest rate 
reached 25-27% that year, much higher than the interest rates in the primary market 
(SBV, 2011). Moreover, some financial institutions also required collaterals for their 
lending. As financial institutions faced many obstacles to access the secondary and the 
tertiary market, they had to return to the traditional market of liquidity – the primary 
market i.e. enterprises and households. So, the question of how to motivate households 
to place their monetary savings in the financial system, so that it can circulate in the 
economy instead of letting cash be kept under the pillows, may be an important issue for 
policy makers. Like in other developing countries, rural households in Vietnam can 
employ the whole variety of saving mechanisms. Households can save their money in 
formal saving intermediaries such as banks, credit funds, and credit associations, or save 
in informal saving intermediaries such as ROSCAs, and private money lenders, or 
simply hoard cash. In Vietnamese households, cash hoarding is extremely dominant 
(Newman et al., 2012). Motivated by the current strain of the financial market, this 
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study investigates whether the selection of the short-term precautionary motive by 
households in rural Vietnam can affect their decision to place monetary savings in 
formal and/or informal saving intermediaries instead of keeping their savings under the 
pillows.  
In developing economies, the possibility to access to the formal financial system is not 
shared equally among people. Especially individuals in rural areas are in disadvantage, 
due to differences in education, differences in geographical distance as well as 
differences of formal institution networks between regions. Filling the gap between 
demand and supply of the formal financial system, the informal financial mechanism is 
recognized as an important channel to accumulate savings for investment through a 
local capital mobilization, which helps to improve the welfare of all participants as well 
as to fulfill needs and safety requirements of household savings (Kimuyu, 1999; 
Gugerty, 2007; Kedir and Ibrahim, 2011; Pellegrina, 2011). The advantage of informal 
institutions such as ROSCAs or private moneylenders over the formal mechanism is 
more obvious in developing economies, especially in rural areas, where the formal 
system is still weak and no full coverage is given. The internal capital does not allow 
formal financial institutions to exist in every commune as well as to develop an 
adequate technical infrastructure like those in urban areas. Additionally, the informal 
financial system neither needs much initial capital nor does it need any sophisticated 
operation system such as offices, laborers, computers, or an accounting computer 
system, etc. Another advantage of the informal system is the information aspect, which 
may lead to lower costs of transaction and less time consuming processes. People 
engaging in a specific informal saving institution are often from the same community 
and share the same information within the group. So, participants can reduce the risk of 
asymmetric information and therefore maneuver around issues like adverse selection, 
43 
 
moral hazard, wrong evaluations, high monitoring costs, high controlling costs, and 
repayment insecurities, whereas at the same time trust and social capital are increased 
(Capenter and Jensen, 2002; Etang et al.,2011; Kedir and Ibrahim, 2011). However, the 
informal financial mechanism cannot completely substitute for the formal mechanism 
because of its nature. Due to its local character, the informal financial mechanism 
cannot exploit the potential advantages of the economies of scale. Also does it only 
focus on small and distinct geographical areas. It is also prone to the domino effect, 
which is likely to occur if an informal representative goes bankrupt. This may lead to 
other representatives also going to bankrupt and to a spread of evil tidings in the local 
area eventually causing further contagion. In the informal mechanism, negative effects 
impact participants more severely because most informal institutions work on the basis 
of the participant’s credibility. Regardless of any advantages and disadvantages, the 
informal financial mechanism still exists as a complementary channel to the formal 
financial system and plays an important role for the development process. The 
household selection of saving mechanisms i.e. formal intermediaries, informal 
intermediaries, or cash hoarding are related to the liquidity each saving mechanism 
offers. For example, long-term motives like the enterprise motive or bequest motive do 
not require liquid savings as the probability of a sudden necessity for this money is 
rather small. However, the precautionary motive requires highly liquid savings in 
developing economies, in which insurance for precautionary purposes seems to be less 
developed (Carrin, 2002). 
Until now, the literature seems to neglect the household selection between cash 
hoarding and deposits to saving intermediaries. In rare cases, like in the studies of 
Carpenter and Jensen (2002), and Newman et al. (2012), the authors directly investigate 
the participation of households into formal and informal saving intermediaries.  
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Carpenter and Jensen (2002) investigate the factors affecting household decisions 
regarding the use of formal and informal saving instruments in Pakistan. The saving 
mechanisms considered are both: banks, representing a formal instrument and bisi, 
representing an informal mechanism similar to a ROSCA. In order to identify the 
determinants of household participation into saving mechanisms, the authors use 
bivariate probit estimations for banks and bisi in both: urban and rural areas. The study 
finds that higher income households have a higher probability to save in banks rather 
than in bisi. Numeracy and literacy are important factors increasing the probability to 
save in a bank while bisi participation is only slightly affected by literacy. The level of 
education is also a determinant influencing the usage of a bank. The participation in a 
bisi is not influenced by education. Other variables can affect household decisions as 
well, e.g. the number of female adults in the household, the occupation of the head of 
the household, and the location of the household (i.e. urban or rural).  
Like the work of Carpenter and Jensen (2002), Newman et al. (2012) use panel data of 
household surveys from 2006, 2008 and 2010. In the study, they investigate the role the 
social network plays in determining the level of household savings in rural Vietnam. 
Basing on the study of Fafchmps et al. (1998), they form a model in which information 
(represented by the membership of the social network) is proven to play an important 
role in determining the level of deposit savings. The social network is divided into two 
sub-categories: high and low quality networks. The results reveal that generally the 
membership of a high quality network positively and significantly connects to the 
overall saving level of households. When disaggregating the overall level into the 
different saving types, it becomes visible that the membership of a high quality network 
can promote savings in both, formal mechanisms and savings in the form of cash at 
home. However, a high quality network membership has a negative marginal effect on 
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the participation in informal savings mechanisms. In regard to the interaction between 
group density and network variables, the results are only robust when looking at the 
overall saving level and when looking at the fragment “home savings”. Results are not 
robust when looking at the participation in formal and informal savings mechanisms. 
The study also finds that a membership in the low quality group has no effect on the 
household saving level. The empirical analysis seems to support the theoretical model 
built before, as the authors found that targeting information through a network would 
increase the level of formal savings. 
In order to contribute to the still few studies in this distinct area, our paper will 
investigate the impact of the short-term precautionary savings’ selection on a household 
decision on joining a saving intermediary in rural Vietnam. We propose the first 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Households who regard the short-term precautionary motive the main 
reason for their saving efforts will have a higher probability of cash hoarding or a 
lower probability of saving through saving intermediaries. 
Households, which tend to be more vulnerable to risks and uncertainty, seem to be 
primarily motivated by the precautionary motive. These households are assumed to keep 
their savings under the pillow as they require a high liquidity because the short-term 
precautionary motive demands prompt expenses in case incidents occur. Saving 
intermediaries often cannot offer such a high liquidity of funds. This line of 
argumentation is especially reasonable for households in remote areas as the transaction 
costs of depositing and withdrawing savings to/from saving intermediaries are higher 
than the costs of cash hoarding.  
The vulnerability of households towards risks and uncertainty could be reduced by the 
enforcement of insurance, which should in turn theoretically and empirically reduce the 
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precautionary savings (Hubbard et al., 1994; 1995; Kotlikoff, 1979; Chou et al., 2003; 
2004). We, therefore form hypothesis 3.2: 
Hypothesis 3.2: An insurance system can substitute for the short-term precautionary 
motive when it comes to the household decision to join saving intermediaries or not.  
The argument is as follows: if the short-term precautionary motive reduces the 
probability of a household to participate in a saving intermediary, the existence of an 
enforced insurance system can inverse this relationship. The number of insurance 
contracts that a household signed and holds will be used as a proxy for the insurance 
system variable. We expect that a higher number of insurance contracts will positively 
relate to the probability of a household to participate in a saving intermediary. 
Households participating in various types of insurance are expected to be less 
vulnerable as risks are covered. Thus the demand for liquid savings is reduced and as a 
result these households will tend to participate in saving intermediaries rather than to 
hoard cash.  
This paper concerns the impacts of the short-term precautionary motive and the 
insurance not only on the probability of household participation, but also on household 
contribution to savings intermediaries, which is mentioned in the last two hypotheses of 
this part. 
Hypothesis 3.3: The participant’s contribution to saving intermediaries is negatively 
affected by the precautionary savings motive. 
Hypothesis 3.3 implies that participants driven by the short-term precautionary motive 
will have lower balances in saving intermediaries compared to households driven by 
long-term saving motives. 
Hypothesis 3.4: The number of insurance contracts that participants signed and hold 
will positively relate to their contribution to saving intermediaries. 
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In hypothesis 3.4, insurance participation is assumed to increase household deposits in 
formal and informal savings intermediaries. The more types of insurance households 
participate in, the more their deposits in saving intermediaries will increase. 
In accordance with the two types of saving mechanisms investigated here, we divide 
households into two different groups: a) participants, including both, formal and 
informal participants, and b) non-participants. Formal participants and informal 
participants represent households having deposits in formal saving intermediaries and 
households with deposits in informal saving intermediaries, respectively. Non-
participants are those who exert cash hoarding. 
Compared to previous studies, our study goes further regarding the sample selection and 
regarding the methodology taken. To avoid the sample selection bias, which may arise 
as households included in the sample have no savings and therefore cannot engage into 
any saving mechanism, we include only savers in our dataset. Regarding the 
methodology, this study will be expanded by considering both, participation probability 
and contribution of households to saving intermediaries. It will also take into account 
the endogeneity issue of the concerned explanatory variables in order to give consistent 
results. 
The remainder of this part is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the empirical analysis. 
Section 3.3 introduces the results. Section 3.4 will give some conclusions and policy 
implications of the paper. 
3.2. Empirical analysis 
The study investigates the impacts the short-term precautionary motive and insurance 
have on a household’s decision regarding the participation and selection of saving 
mechanisms in rural Vietnam.  
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Because of the plain cross section structure, we use the following reduced form of an 
equation: 
i
K
k
kiJk
J
j
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+
= 11
0 βββ                                                    (3.1) 
Di is the household participation and contribution to formal and informal saving 
intermediaries. K is the number of excluded exogenous regressors. J equals to 2 and Xi 
is the vector of two variables: the short-term precautionary motive and the number of 
insurance contracts. These two variables are separated from the others since the main 
concern of the study is to investigate the role of the short-term precautionary motive and 
insurance on household decisions towards saving mechanisms. Wki is a vector of 
exogenous variables including household head’s characteristics and household’s 
characteristics. Household head’s characteristics are gender, education, employer and 
age. The education of the household head’s variable takes three different values: (1) 
tertiary and above, (2) vocational training or other diplomas, and (3) below primary-
school level of education (i.e. has not finished elementary education or no school 
enrollment at all). The employer of the household head is classified into governmental 
sector, firms and enterprises, private employers (small business owners or other 
households). The base category is the self-employed household head. Household’s 
characteristics include household wealth (measuring total wealth of a given household), 
the number of household members, dependency rate (rate of household members not in 
the labor force), ethnicity, household location, and the number of insurance contracts 
that households signed and hold. 
Because the dependent variable contains censored values (left-censored zero), the Tobit 
model is normally used to conduct estimations (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). However, 
as the Tobit model often faces weaknesses during the diagnostic analysis such as 
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normality and heteroskedasticity35, we use the two-part model instead. The two-part 
model consists of two separated parts: a binary outcome model (first part) and a linear 
model (second part). Being a binary model, the Probit model is employed in the first 
part to estimate the probability of household participation to formal and informal saving 
intermediaries in rural Vietnam. The dependent variable (Di) in equation (3.1) is a 
dummy variable, receiving a value of one for participants and of zero for non-
participants, i.e. in the binary estimation, Di receives 1 if the household i has deposits in 
either formal or informal saving intermediaries and Di receives 0 if the household i 
hoards cash.  
The linear model in the second part estimates the household contribution to formal or 
informal saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. The dependent variable (Di) in 
equation (3.1) is the natural logarithm of household deposits in saving intermediaries. In 
other words, Di measures the level of a participant’s deposits in formal and/or informal 
saving intermediaries. If the error term in the model is related to the regressor, the OLS 
estimators will be inconsistent and cannot yield a causal interpretation. Two main 
variables, the short-term precautionary motive and the number of insurance contracts 
are in this case considered to be endogenously determined. The instrumental-variables 
(IV) method is employed to eliminate the endogeneity issue of these two variables. 
A set of instruments is used to control for the endogeneity of the endogenous variables. 
This set composes three exogenous variables comprising ethnicity, gender of the 
household head, and the distance between the household and the center of the town. 
Some intuitive explanations could be used to prove the possible impacts of these 
instruments on the precautionary motive and insurance. First, people belonging to the 
Kinh ethnicity may have easier access to organizations as this group makes up for 
                                                 
35
 Appendix B.2 
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85.7% of total population in 2009. The second largest ethnicity – the Tay group – 
accounts for only 1.89% (UNFPA, 2011). The ethnic origin of households is still 
relatively important in Vietnam. This means that people belonging to the larger Kinh 
group might have better connections and stronger networks they can rely on, which may 
reduce the precautionary motive but increase other motives as investment or buying 
high-value durable goods. The gender of the household head may affect saving motives, 
especially in developing economies. As shown in table 3.2 of the descriptive statistics, 
the role of males in households seems to be dominant as the rate of male household 
heads is 82% in the complete sample (82% in the non-participant group, and 80% in the 
participant group). In Eastern countries, women are often taking care of work within the 
house such as homework and child care while men are mainly considered to be the main 
income source and responsible for work outside the house. Also the male is normally 
the decision taker in the household and he is the main connection to people outside the 
family. A female household head may concentrate more on the short-term precautionary 
motive while a male household head may focus more on the long-term investment 
motive, which can yield additional income. Insurance was found to be influenced by 
gender. Gender differences have significant impacts on insurance in many studies (Rand 
and Tarp, 2011; Dong et al., 2003; Buor, 2004; Thoursie, 2007). The female claimants 
were found to receive lower payments from insurances than men, holding other factors 
constant (Doerspinghaus et al., 2008). Additionally, insurance was affected by the 
distance variable, which was considered as a proxy of transaction costs. Distance can be 
seen as an important factor which can impede the insurance sector in developing 
economies. Buor (2004) proved that the distance to health facilities has high impacts on 
female insurance utilization. In another study, Dong et al. (2003) found that the distance 
to health facilities had negative influence on the willingness-to-pay of the insurance.  
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The data used for this study is from a household survey of rural areas in Vietnam, 
namely VARHS08 (Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey: Characteristics of 
the Vietnamese Rural Economy, 2008 Survey). This survey was funded by Danida and 
conducted by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), in cooperation 
with the University of Copenhagen, the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (IPSARD), and the Institute for Labor Science and Social 
Affairs (ILSSA)36. The full dataset comes from the surveys in 2006, 2008 and 2010, but 
an existing access limitation does hinder us to attain the richness of the whole dataset. 
The accessible part of the data is the 2008 section, which we use here.  
A total of 3269 households participated in this survey. The survey questionnaires 
comprise a wide range of household and household member characteristics such as 
household demographics, land use, agricultural production, household assets, 
occupation and income, training, savings, credits, shocks and social networks. 
Households surveyed spread from the north to the south of Vietnam. The households are 
classified into four regions: Northern Midlands – mountain, North Central, Central 
Highlands, and Mekong River Delta. A sample of 1342 households is used for the study 
and these share the same characteristic: namely that they have monetary savings, which 
are either kept at home (in form of cash, gold, and jewelry) or deposited in financial 
intermediaries (formal or informal). Households that do both, cash hoarding and 
depositing in financial institutions are excluded from the sample. 
 
                                                 
36 http://www.ambhanoi.um.dk/en/menu/AboutUs/News/NewsArchives2009/HouseholdSurvey2008Launched.htm 
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Table 3.1: Saving motives 
Motives 
Number (and %) of households 
All Non-participants 
Participants  
Both Formal Informal 
Short-term precautionary motive 594 (44.26) 544 (46.98) 50 (27.17) 24 (29.27) 27 (25.47) 
Protecting against bad harvest and natural disasters 104 (7.75) 90 (7.77) 14 (7.61) 7 (8.54) 7 (6.60) 
Health care expenses 304 (22.65) 280 (24.18) 24 (13.04) 15 (18.29) 9 (8.49) 
Buying agricultural inputs 186 (13.86) 174 (15.03) 12 (6.52) 2 (2.44) 11 (10.38) 
Long-term motive 748 (55.74) 614 (53.02) 134 (72.83) 58 (70.73) 79 (74.53) 
Accumulating for big expenditures 375 (27.94) 312 (26.94) 63 (34.24) 23 (28.05) 42 (39.62) 
Providing for old age 132 (9.84) 104 (8.98) 28 (15.22) 15 (18.29) 13 (12.26) 
Profit-making investment 27 (2.01) 12 (1.04) 15 (8.15) 5 (6.10) 10 (9.43) 
Cost of education 139 (10.36) 121 (10.45) 18 (9.78) 13 (15.85) 6 (5.66) 
Others  75 (5.59) 65 (5.61) 10 (5.43) 2 (2.44) 8 (7.55) 
Total 1342 1158  184  82 106 
Note: numbers in parentheses are percentage 
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Table 3.1 provides the general picture of household monetary savings in rural Vietnam. 
There is a big gap between keeping monetary savings at home and depositing savings in 
financial institutions. While most households (86.3% or 1158 over 1342 households) 
keep their monetary savings at home (non-participants), only 13.7% of savers deposit 
monetary savings to saving intermediaries. However, among participants, formal and 
informal participants share quite equivalent portions with 44.6% and 57.6%, 
respectively. The numbers are consistent with those in urban Pakistan (Carpenter and 
Jensen, 2002). 
The data description also provides answers to the question: Why do households save? 
For reasons of data availability, these motives are separated into two categories: short-
term precautionary and long-term motives. The short-term precautionary motive 
(including protecting against bad harvest and natural disasters, health care expenses, and 
buying agricultural inputs) is defined as those in which savings can be used for short-
term, regular, and unforeseen circumstances. We add savings for agricultural inputs as 
one of the short-term precautionary motives since in rural Vietnam most households 
engage in agricultural production, what demands from households to put aside a certain 
amount of money for inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, or labor. Farmers often face 
problems with these inputs such as the low quality of seeds and fertilizers, increasing 
working salaries for seasonal labors, or extra expenses for water and electricity. The 
long-term motives represent those purposes in which savings are not used for regular, 
immediate or sudden needs. In the full sample, households pay more attention to long-
term motives (55.74%) rather than short-term precautionary motives (44.26%). 
However, participants and non-participants behave differently. While in the total 
sample, the rates of non-participants with short-term precautionary and long-term 
motives do not largely differ from each other, most of participants (72.83%) save for 
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their long-term motives. Health care expenses is the most concerned issue within the 
short-term precautionary motives, while the accumulation for big expenditures is the 
most important issue within long-term motives. This is in accordance with Besley et al. 
(1993) and Kedir and Ibrahim (2011). There is a distinction when we compare with the 
profit-making investment motive. Within non-participants, the investment motive 
accounts for only one per cent, while the figures of the participanting groups are much 
higher with 8.15%, 6.1%, and 9.43% for all participants, formal participants, and 
informal participants, respectively. 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for some other variables used in the study. 
Relating to household head’s characteristics, the data shows that most household heads 
are male (82%). Only a low rate of household heads work outside their own households 
as a majority (70%) of household heads work as self-employed workers within their 
own households. 20% of household heads are employed by individuals, 6.2% by the 
public or government sector, and 2.5% by firms or enterprises. There is no highly 
significant difference among non-participants and others in detailed comparisons. The 
educational indicator separates education of household heads into three levels. The first 
level (Primary) represents those who are illiterate or did not finish primary school. With 
90% most household heads are in this category. 8.1% of household heads completed 
vocational training, professional high school or junior diploma (Vocational) while the 
tertiary education (Tertiary) represents 2.2% of total household heads. The mean 
difference of the second educational level is statistically significant when we compare 
participants and non-participants or when we compare non-participants and formal 
participants. 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of selected variables 
 
All  Non-participants 
Participants  
Both Formal 
participants  
Informal 
participants  
Employer of household head      
Public sector .062 .055    .103** .110 .094 
Firms .025 .024 .033 .037 .038 
Private  .209 .212 .190 .134* .236 
Self-employed .704 .709 .674 .719 .632 
Male  .820 .820 .800 .790 .800 
Primary .897 .906 .842  .756 .906 
Vocational .081 .073    .125**       .195*** .075 
Tertiary  .022 .021 .033  .049 .019 
Ethnicity  .707 .685     .848***        .939***     .783** 
Dependency rate .34  .35    .28 *** .31     .24 *** 
Number of person in household 4.7 4.8  4.4 ***    4.2 *** 4.6 
Location of household      
North .383 .361    .522***    .476**     .566*** 
Center .227 .244    .120*** .220     .038*** 
Highlands .282 .302    .152*** .256     .075*** 
South .108 .093 .206 .048 .321 
Number of insurance 1.33  1.28       1.64 ***    1.72 ***  1.6*** 
Observations 1342 1158 184 82 106 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significance level of mean differences when compared to non-participants) 
56 
 
Most households are located in the North (38.3%) and in Central Vietnam (22.7%). 
28.2% are from the Central Highlands and 10.8% are from the Mekong River Delta. 
The ethnicity also seems to differ among non-participants and others. The Kinh group – 
the largest ethnic group in Vietnam – makes up for 70.7% of total observations, and 
other ethnics make up for the rest (29.3%). The dependency rate (the rate of under-16 
years old and over-60 years old people of total household members) within the non-
participant group is relatively higher than that within the participant group. One channel 
for the precautionary selection, namely insurance, is employed by most households in 
the sample. The data shows that 84% of households hold at least one insurance contract 
for their households or for their members. On average, each household engages in 1.33 
insurance schemes. There exists a mean difference regarding the number of insurance 
contracts between formal participants and non-participants, and between informal 
participants and non-participants. The average number of insurance contracts that 
participants signed and hold is statistically higher than that of non-participants at the 5% 
significance level. 
3.3. The results 
3.3.1. Household participation in saving intermediaries 
In the binary model, we consider the impact of the precautionary motive’s selection and 
insurance factor on three different groups of households. The first group, including all 
households (non-participants and participants), is called the total group. The second 
group includes non-participants and formal participants and it is called the formal 
group. The third group, namely the informal group, includes non-participants and 
informal participants. We compare the participation probability between the two parties 
within each group.  
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For robustness, three estimations have been run for each household group. The first 
estimation includes only the two concerned variables (the precautionary motive and the 
number of insurance contracts). For the second estimation, we add the household head’s 
variables as control factors, and the third estimation employs both household head’s 
variables and household’s characteristics, as control variables.  
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results regarding the household participation 
probability to formal and informal saving intermediaries. The influence of the short-
term precautionary variable and the insurance variable is robust across estimations and 
household groups.  
The results confirm hypothesis 3.1. They indicate that the short-term precautionary 
motive may lead to a decreasing probability of households to deposit to saving 
intermediaries in rural Vietnam. This means that households whose saving efforts are 
mainly driven by the short-term precautionary motive will have less tendency to deposit 
their monetary savings to saving intermediaries or they exert cash hoarding for 
precautionary reasons. The informal participants seem to play a dominant role compared 
to the formal participants, as the full sample is mainly affected by the sign and 
significance level of the informal participants. Within the formal group, the effect is not 
highly significant while the impact in the informal group is statistically highly 
significant, what in turn results in a high significance in the full sample. The impact of 
the precautionary motive is also larger within the informal group, what is reflected by a 
larger coefficient. That means that households driven by the short-run precautionary 
motive may have a higher probability to deposit to informal saving intermediaries when 
comparing with the probability of these households to deposit to formal saving 
institutions.  
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Table 3.3: Probit estimation results of household’s participation in saving intermediaries 
 Saving intermediaries 
 Total Formal  Informal  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Precautionary motive -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.38*** -0.32*** -0.30** -0.24* -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.45***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Insurance 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Household head’s characteristics      
Lnage  0.30* 0.32  0.64*** 0.81***  0.02 -0.08 
  (0.16) (0.20)  (0.21) (0.26)  (0.19) (0.24) 
Vocational  0.13 0.05  0.44*** 0.36*  -0.23 -0.28 
  (0.15) (0.16)  (0.17) (0.18)  (0.19) (0.22) 
Tertiary  -0.06 -0.11  0.23 0.13  -0.35 -0.28 
  (0.29) (0.32)  (0.32) (0.34)  (0.43) (0.50) 
Gov  0.24 0.24  0.14 0.17  0.30 0.20 
  (0.18) (0.19)  (0.23) (0.23)  (0.22) (0.25) 
Firms  0.12 0.08  0.08 0.10  0.25 0.09 
  (0.26) (0.28)  (0.32) (0.33)  (0.30) (0.32) 
Private  0.02 0.13  -0.10 0.10  0.11 0.16 
  (0.12) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.18)  (0.13) (0.14) 
Household’s charcteristics         
Dependency rate    -0.37**   -0.16   -0.57** 
   (0.19)   (0.23)   (0.24) 
Person    -0.09***  -0.15***   -0.03 
   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.03) 
LnWealth   0.34***  0.46*** 0.22***
   (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.06) 
North   0.05   1.09***   -0.24 
   (0.15)   (0.28)   (0.16) 
Center   -0.56***  0.81*** -1.24***
   (0.17)   (0.30)   (0.24) 
Highlands   -0.55***  0.82*** -1.15***
   (0.17)   (0.30)   (0.21) 
Constant  -1.20*** -2.40*** -6.01*** -1.69*** -4.20*** -10.87*** -1.44*** -1.53** -3.10** 
 
(0.09) (0.66) (1.14) (0.12) (0.88) (1.55) (0.11) (0.75) (1.30) 
Observations 1,342 1,342 1,342 1,240 1,240 1,240 1,264 1,264 1,264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0. 05, * p<0.1 
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The negative impact of the short-term precautionary selection may indicate that in case 
of the short-term precautionary motive, the cost of cash hoarding cannot be fully 
covered by its benefits. These costs can be the opportunity cost as no interest is paid, the 
risk of theft, or even the destruction of money (e.g. by fire). The benefits in this case are 
the return to savings in the form of deposits and the opportunity cost of not paying the 
transaction cost when households engage in saving intermediaries. A short cost-benefit 
analysis may lead households to the decision to keep monetary savings under the pillow 
instead of depositing savings in formal and informal saving intermediaries. 
Hypothesis 3.2 is empirically supported as the insurance system is found to be a 
supplement for the precautionary savings motive. In the estimations, the number of 
insurance contracts is statistically significant and positively related to household 
participation. In both cases, formal and informal participation, the more types of 
insurance the household has, the higher the probability of household participation to 
saving intermediaries is. The results confirm the precautionary view as households 
protecting themselves by paying for insurance will reduce their need to exert cash 
hoarding for precautionary reasons. The insurance system can thus push households to 
take part in formal and informal financial institutions. The results regarding insurance 
and the short-term precautionary motive prove that insurance can be used as a substitute 
for monetary savings at home and a large number of insurance contracts per household 
reduce the probability cash hoarding being exerted in rural households in Vietnam. 
The results regarding the control variables show that the education level of household 
heads has no effect on household decisions where to put their monetary savings (in 
formal or informal saving intermediaries). Similar to Kedir and Ibrahim (2011), whose 
results show that there is no evidence of any public sector impact on participation 
decisions regarding ROSCAs, we find that the sector that employs the household head 
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does not statistically affect the household participation to saving intermediaries. The 
dependency rate seems to decrease the household motivation to join saving 
intermediaries in the general case. A higher dependency rate may associate with a high 
demand for precautionary savings or a high liquidity of savings. For example, 
households with a high rate of young individuals need more resources for monthly 
expenditures like for health, education, and others, so these households have to put aside 
more of their monetary savings for the sake of the precautionary motive. However, the 
effect is statistically insignificant for the formal participants while the coefficients still 
share the negative signs. The insignificance of the impact in the aggregated group may 
come from the dominant role of the dependency rate in the informal group.  
The empirical results in this part confirm our hypothesis 3.1 namely that the household’s 
selection of the short-term precautionary saving motive will reduce the probability of 
the household engaging in formal and informal saving intermediaries. In addition, 
insurance is found to have significant impacts on the participation probability, which 
means that the findings support for our hypothesis 3.2, stating that insurance can 
substitute for the short-term precautionary motive. 
3.3.1. The participant’s contribution to saving intermediaries 
The second part presents the participant’s contribution to formal or informal saving 
intermediaries. In this part, non-participants are excluded from the sample. In other 
words, all households in the sample used for these estimations are either formal 
participants or informal participants. Regarding participants in general and informal 
participants (except for the first estimation), the Hausman tests indicate that the 
endogeneity issue persists. In order to eliminate the problem of weak instruments, the 
IV LIML model is used in those estimations. With regard to estimations for formal 
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participants, the exogenous hypothesis test cannot be rejected, so the robust OLS 
estimation is used to yield consistent results.  
The results in table 3.4 show the determinants of the participant’s contribution to saving 
intermediaries in rural Vietnam. The first three specifications are for all participants. 
The next three specifications are for the formal participants, and last three for the 
informal participants, respectively. Most variables are less significant compared to those 
in the probit estimations. This may result from the smaller sample size with 82 and 106 
observations in the formal participant group and the informal participant group, 
respectively. 
Hypothesis 3.3 is empirically confirmed in the case of formal participants. The short-
term precautionary motive has negative effects on the participant’s contribution to 
formal saving intermediaries. However, these impacts are less significant than those 
estimated in the participation aspect with the probit specifications. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is again larger in the informal participant case. This may be explained by the 
probability that formal participants behave consistent with the precautionary motive in 
either participation or contribution. With a less-developed insurance system, the 
precautionary motive is primarily dominant. When households focus on the 
precautionary reason, they deposit less in saving intermediaries, especially in the case 
we speak about formal saving intermediaries, which may generate higher transaction 
costs as well as less liquidity compared to cash hoarding.  
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Table 3.4: Linear estimation results of participant’s contributions to saving intermediaries  
 Savings intermediaries 
 Total Formal  Informal  
 (1)
a (2)a (3)a (4)b (5)b (6)b (7)b (8)a (9)a 
Precautionary motive -4.09 -4.76 -4.94 -0.66** -0.69** -0.68* -0.23 -4.30 -6.47 
(3.36) (3.99) (4.33) (0.26) (0.29) (0.36) (0.25) (9.69) (5.85) 
Insurance 1.17 1.43 1.56 0.07 0.05 -0.00 0.30* 0.71 -1.25 
 (1.78) (1.91) (2.68) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (4.30) (2.99) 
Household head’s characteristics       
Lnage  -0.87 -0.70  -0.66 -0.33  -3.24 -5.07 
  (1.04) (1.00)  (0.59) (0.58)  (4.73) (3.83) 
Vocational  -0.54 -0.90  0.32 0.11  -0.29 1.66 
  (2.42) (3.01)  (0.36) (0.36)  (4.58) (3.36) 
Tertiary  -0.84 -1.33  -0.15 -0.10  0.44 -1.68 
  (1.12) (1.22)  (0.60) (0.69)  (3.40) (2.35) 
Gov  -1.77 -1.65  -0.43 -0.03  -0.25 1.52 
  (1.44) (1.80)  (0.59) (0.63)  (3.75) (2.88) 
Firms  -1.67 -1.28  -0.29 0.19  -2.39 -2.95 
  (1.04) (1.06)  (0.27) (0.39)  (4.06) (2.25) 
Private  -1.80** -1.39**  -0.13 0.33  -2.00 -2.83 
  (0.72) (0.70)  (0.40) (0.42)  (1.89) (1.88) 
Household’s charcteristics         
Dependency rate    -0.08   0.03   2.21 
   (0.91)   (0.56)   (2.18) 
Person    -0.05   -0.05   0.14 
   (0.25)   (0.08)   (0.38) 
LnWealth   0.20   0.49***   0.93 
   (0.34)   (0.15)   (0.69) 
North   0.56   -0.14   -2.38 
   (1.97)   (0.50)   (2.93) 
Center   1.10   -0.05   0.92 
   (0.90)   (0.54)   (1.94) 
Highlands   2.12**   0.46   -0.50 
   (1.01)   (0.49)   (1.50) 
Constant  8.72** 12.54* 8.65 10.54*** 13.23*** 5.64** 8.38*** 21.88 20.88 
 
(3.41) (6.79) (7.17) (0.25) (2.39) (2.47) (0.29) (27.24) (14.59) 
Observations 184 184 184 82 82 82 106 106 106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a estimations use the IV LIML method, and b the estimations use the normal OLS 
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Hypothesis 3.4 is not quantitatively supported as there is no significant impact of the 
number of insurance contracts on the household contribution to saving intermediaries. It 
implies that regardless of the number of insurance that the household holds, formal and 
informal participants deposit indifferently to saving intermediaries. These participants 
may have other resources, which can insure households against risks and uncertainty 
such as support from relatives and friends. Therefore they are self-confident to cover all 
their expenses in case they have to and do not count only on insurances. So, little 
attention is paid to the insurance issue and the empirical results reject hypothesis 3.4.  
The contribution of participants to saving intermediaries differs between formal 
participants with the short-term precautionary saving motive and those with the long-
term saving motive. However, the role of the insurance is not significant in determining 
the level of the participant’s contribution to saving intermediaries. 
The results of the household participation and contribution to formal and informal 
saving intermediaries may give some implications for policy makers. First, with an 
under-development of the financial system and a cash-based economy, transaction costs 
may be important in determining household decisions in choosing saving 
intermediaries. Policies aiming at reducing the cost of savings in saving intermediaries 
should be emphasized and the decentralization of formal mechanisms can be a solution. 
The opening of branches locally or the appearance of financial representatives or agents 
can increase the liquidity of the household deposits. This can reduce the transaction 
cost, which can be considered as the main obstacle for the household participation into 
saving institutions. Formal rural financial institutions such as the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBA), the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP), the 
People’s Credit Fund (PCFs) can combine financial tools to reduce the transaction costs 
and thus to attract more deposits. These tools can be deposit incentives such as the 
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variation of deposit types, the flexibility of deposit time and interest rates, etc. Another 
way to reduce the transaction cost is prolonging the working time of financial agents 
during working days and at the weekend. This could be more economical than opening 
new branches. Second, policy makers can encourage households to deposit to saving 
intermediaries by increasing the credibility of informal financial institutions. Private 
money lenders and ROSCAs should be observed by the local authorities through a 
registration procedure, which ensures informal financial activities to properly perform. 
Being recognized by law, informal financial intermediaries in Vietnam might attract 
many more participants. However, the informal financial intermediaries are unregistered 
and operate privately, and they receive no control, observation, or audits from 
governmental offices. This may be the main reason for many recent bankruptcies of 
many informal intermediaries, and as a result, it reduces the credibility of the informal 
intermediaries, which leads to a possible decrease of the household participation and 
contribution to this type of financial mechanism. In addition, promoting the insurance 
system is one direction to foster the household participation to saving intermediaries. 
Rural households can use insurance schemes as a channel to insure against risks rather 
than by hoarding cash. Households being insured tend to leave the short-term 
precautionary selection and move towards other long-term motives, which leads 
households to use more services of financial intermediaries.  
3.4. Conclusions  
The paper presents empirical evidence for what role the short-term precautionary 
motive and insurance play in affecting the household participation and contribution to 
saving institutions in rural Vietnam. Using the two-part model, we identify the impact 
of the precautionary motive and the number of insurance contracts on both, household 
participation and participant’s contribution separately. The probit model is used to test 
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hypothesis 3.1 and hypothesis 3.2. Hypothesis 3.1 states that households which regard 
the precautionary motive as the primary reason for their savings will have a higher 
probability of cash hoarding or less probability to join any saving intermediaries 
compared to those households who prefer long-term motives. Hypothesis 3.2 states that 
insurance can be regarded a substitute for the short-term precautionary motive. The 
linear model is employed to answer the third and the forth hypotheses in this part, which 
investigate the role of the short-term precautionary savings motive and the number of 
insurance contracts in participant’s contribution to saving intermediaries.  
The study finds that the first two hypotheses (hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2) are empirically 
supported, while hypothesis 3.3 is partially proven. The results lead to a rejection of 
hypothesis 3.4. First, the household selection between the short-term precautionary 
saving motive and the long-term motive statistically differ in the engagement to saving 
intermediaries. If the primary motive is short-term precaution, households tend to exert 
cash hoarding rather than to deposit their savings to saving intermediaries. Second, we 
find that in order to substitute for short-term precautionary savings, insurance can be 
used as a channel, as the number of insurance contracts is found to be positively related 
to the participation probability. Third, with regard to participant’s contributions, which 
measure the household deposits in saving intermediaries, the short-term precautionary 
variable has significant impacts on household deposits in formal saving intermediaries. 
Differences in selection between the short-term precautionary and long-term saving 
motives will lead to differences in formal participant’s contributions. Furthermore, the 
study finds no significant evidence for insurances’ influence on participant’s 
contributions to saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. 
  
66 
 
4. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN 
CAPITAL, AND FIRM GROWTH: EVIDENCE 
FROM VIETNAM 
This chapter is based on the paper “Institutional environment, human capital, and firm 
growth: evidence from Vietnam” by Gries, T. and Ha, V. D. It has been published 
within the Working Paper Series by the Center for International Economics of the 
University of Paderborn. 
4.1. Introduction 
Countries try to develop through expansion of a market economy. Entrepreneurship is a 
core element of developing a market economy. As a result, many studies have focused 
on entrepreneurship in developed and transitional countries.37 However, in developing 
countries which start to turn into a modern market economy, we do not know much 
about entrepreneurship and we are not clear about what fosters firms and firm growth 
under the conditions these infant market economies provide. Existing theories on firm 
growth do not sufficiently consider the institutional environment of less developed 
markets in developing economies (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002). Furthermore, the 
literature has not fully investigated the contribution of entrepreneurial activities, which 
is one of the important factors to consider in underdeveloped and low income 
economies (Gries and Naude, 2011).  If we know more about the institutional 
environment and if we can identify which entrepreneurial characteristics are needed in 
order to be successful, the answers can be useful for policy designers regarding how to 
foster firm growth. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role factors describing 
                                                 
37 Dunne et al. (1989), Dunne and Hughes (1994), Liu et al. (1999), Burke et al. (2000), Reichstein and 
Dahl (2004), Yusada (2005), Honjo and Harada (2006), Praag (2006), Park et al. (2010), Tomczyk et al. 
(2013)  
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the institutional environment (or institutional factors) and the entrepreneur’s education 
play for firm growth in a low income, infant market economy like Vietnam. The 
empirical study has found that the institutional environment significantly affects firm 
performance. A more surprising finding is that the institutional factors are more 
significantly affecting the growth of a firm’s capital than that of a firm’s employment. 
Furthermore, firm growth is affected by skills and abilities of entrepreneurs.  
The firm dynamics originate from Gibrat’s law of proportion effect (LPE), which is the 
base for stochastic models. It states that the firm growth function is a randomly 
distributed model. According to this law, firm growth is independent of its size. Size 
distribution of firms will increase with time and firms share the same growth 
opportunities across size (Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 2006).  However, in accordance to 
recent studies in developed and transitional economies, many empirical researches in 
developing economies showed that the Gibrat’s Law does not hold. In an empirical 
study, McPherson (1996) finds that there exists a negative relationship between firm 
growth and both firm size and firm age when he investigates micro and small firms in 
southern Africa. Using the linear estimation method, he considers determinants of firm 
growth as size and age, sector, location, human capital, and socio-economic variables. 
Sector differentiates firm growth as firms in the construction and the service sector have 
probably higher growth rates. Firms in urban and commercial areas grow more rapidly 
than those in rural and suburban areas. Gender discrimination is found to persist as 
firms with male entrepreneurs experience higher growth rates. Mead and Liedholm 
(1998) descriptively support the inclusion that there is a negative impact of firm age, 
firm size and female entrepreneurs on firm growth. They conduct a survey to examine 
the determinants of growth of micro and small firms in Dominica and five African 
countries (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe). They find that 
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enterprises in these countries grow faster if they are smaller, younger, and male-headed 
firms. The sectorial variable differently affects firm growth across countries. However, 
the study of Biesebroeck (2005) finds superior performance of large firms. To 
investigate the impacts of firm size on firm growth and productivity of manufacturing 
enterprises in nine sub-Saharan African countries, the study uses a panel data set from 
1992 to 1996 including approximately 200 firms per country. The results reveal that the 
largest manufacturing firms display the highest growth rates in sub-Saharan African 
countries. Firms with 100 employees and above are more productive and more likely to 
survive. Large firms are found to grow faster and to increase productivity faster. The 
aggregate productivity growth is largely dependent on the performance of large firms. 
The contribution of micro and small firms to aggregate productivity growth is not 
remarkable.  
Apart from enterprise characteristics, institutional factors such as the quality and 
quantity of infrastructure, the nature and the enforcement of business regulations, 
property rights, and the openness of public resources are considered as important 
determinants of firm growth (Aterido et al., 2011). Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) 
use data of manufacturing firms in Côte d’Ivoire to investigate the influence of 
institutional elements on firm growth. A sample of 185 manufacturing firms from 1995 
was selected. Quantitative results indicate that the legitimation of firms has positive 
impacts on firm growth and that there exists a negative relationship between firm 
growth and both, firm size and firm age. Results show that firm growth obstacles, 
including regulatory barriers, market constraints, infrastructure, and financial 
constraints differ systematically with firm size. Large and micro firms report less 
frequent constraints compared to small and medium firms. Fisman and Svensson (2007) 
employ firm data in Uganda to study the impacts of bribery payments and taxes on firm 
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growth. These two business environment factors are found to have negative impacts on 
firm growth, whereby the negative influence of corruption is more severe to firm 
performance than that of taxation. Corruption is also considered an obstacle to firm 
growth in the work of Honorati and Mengistae (2007). The growth of small-scale 
manufacturing firms in India is examined and a relatively small sample size has been 
employed. Four institutional factors including corruption, labor regulation, access to 
finance, and the quality of power supplies are obstacles to business operation and 
growth. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) emphasize the importance of the investment 
climate for firm performance in China with a large sample size of 1,500 firms. 
Technological infrastructure, government regulatory burdens, and corruption matter 
largely, while labor market flexibility and access to finance are found to have less 
impact on firm growth. In another study using a large number of firms, Dollar et al. 
(2005) investigate the investment climate and its impacts on firm growth in 4 
developing countries, including China, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. There is a 
significant variation of investment climates within each country and the role local 
government plays is important. Power outages and customs delays are the most severe 
obstacles for firm productivity and profitability. The availability of financial services 
strongly relates to firm growth. However, they do not find any impacts of general issues 
of governance and corruption across countries and locations. The influence of 
corruption is considered in detail in the research of Wang and You (2012), which 
indicates that corruption likely fosters firm growth in China. This study also shows that 
the disparity of financial development across regions affects firm growth. Because of 
the imperfect Chinese financial market, higher probability to access external finance is 
supposed to enhance firm growth.  
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The literature on firm growth in Vietnam is relatively rare. This may result from the 
unavailability of firm-level data, which requires many resources. Hansen et al. (2009) 
use data from three overlapping surveys during the period of 1990 and 2000 to 
investigate the impacts of government assistance and other interactions with the state 
sector on long-term performance of small and medium size manufacturing enterprises in 
Vietnam. Starting with a total of 447 firms in 1990, the data set is reduced to 300 
incumbent firms in 2000 due to the combination of three different datasets. The 
determinants of SME growth have been indicated. Firm size relates negatively to firm 
growth while urban firms grow faster than their rural counterparts. Sole proprietorship, 
cooperatives, and limited liability firms also grow faster than household firms. The 
initial government assistance seems to have positive impacts on firm growth. Firms that 
have the state sector as a customer grow faster than those without customers from the 
state sector. Another study with 337 manufacturing SMEs in 2005 has been done by 
Tuan and Yoshi (2009) employing the normal OLS for multiple estimators. The results 
reveal that SMEs introducing new products grow faster than those without new 
products. Firm size, firm age, and competition intensity negatively relate to firm growth, 
while higher private shares will promote the growth of firms. Nguyen and Dijk (2012) 
use data of 874 enterprises from a survey in 2005 to analyze the relationship between 
corruption and growth of private and state-owned enterprises in Vietnam. They use 
three different perceived measures for corruption and find that corruption is harmful to 
growth of private firms but not for state-owned firms. They also induce that the quality 
of provincial public governance such as land access, private sector development policy, 
and the costs of new business entries can generate significant differences in the level of 
corruption across provinces in Vietnam.  
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The literature on the role the institutional environment plays for firm growth and 
performance in developing economies is rather limited. Most previous studies use either 
firm-level subjective or objective measures for the institutional environment and no 
study is able to look at a comprehensive number of institutional conditions. Firm-level 
subjective measures represent a firm’s attitude towards the business environment and 
the data relies on questions such as: “Do business associations play an important role in 
advising and countering policy?” And the answer may be a Likert scale ranked from 1 
to 5 or higher. The objective measures relate to countable values of the business 
environment such as “How many times did your firm receive tax inspections last year?”.  
We would like to fill this literature gap by employing absolutely new indicators as 
proxies for the institutional environment. These indicators compromise both objective 
and subjective measures and are considered comprehensive indicators for the 
institutional environment. These indicators are professionally established to measure 
different dimensions of the business environment and are regarded as critical tools for 
measuring and assessing the standards of economic governance in Vietnam (VCCI, 
2013). This is one objective of this paper and we therefore concentrate on the role the 
institutional environment plays for firm growth in Vietnam as a representative for  
developing economies. Deriving the idea from the theoretical work of Gries and Naude 
(2011), it is suggested that successful entrepreneurial activities are more likely if the 
market environment allows a match between entrepreneurial ideas and opportunities in 
the market to establish a successful business, we form hypothesis 4.1 with additional 
modifications: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Higher levels of institutional factors will be positively related to firm 
growth. 
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This hypothesis implies that firms located in provinces which have experienced higher 
points on the institutional quality scale will associate with higher growth rates. In other 
words, the business environment created by the local authority is considered a 
determinant of firm performance and the quality of local economic governance will 
affect firm growth in the same direction.  
The literature on firm dynamics in developing economies seems to neglect the role of 
entrepreneurial human capital. Relatively few studies have focused on this issue and the 
results are mixed. The study of McPherson (1996) includes entrepreneurial human 
capital to the model and finds that human capital positively relates to firm growth. 
Enterprises with trained entrepreneurs grow faster than those with untrained 
entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurial human capital seems to have no impacts on 
growth according to other studies. Hansen et al. (2009) measure the impacts of 
entrepreneurial human capital by adding the level of education of the entrepreneur into 
the model specifications, but they don’t find any significant evidence for the effect of 
this variable on firm performance. The study of Tuan and Yoshi (2009) leads to the 
same conclusion when they use two indicators for human capital of entrepreneurs 
including education and working experience in the specifications. Both indicators for 
human capital are found to have no impact on firm growth. In order to fill the gap in the 
literature, we would like to examine the role of entrepreneurial human capital on firm 
growth in Vietnam and following the theoretical work of Gries and Naude (2011) on the 
impacts of human development on entrepreneurial functioning,38 we form hypothesis 
4.2:  
                                                 
38
 Which implies that the human capital development will associate with a higher degree of 
entrepreneurial functioning. 
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Hypothesis 4.2: Human capital development of entrepreneurs will associate with a 
higher degree of firm performance or a higher level of education of entrepreneurs will 
result in higher growth rates of firms. 
Hypothesis 4.2 states that firms with entrepreneurs with higher levels of education are 
likely to experience higher growth rates.  
In order to justify these two hypotheses, we use firm-level data in combination with 
provincial data. One important contribution of this study is that it employs a rich data 
set from a yearly census, which has not been explored before reaching a total of over 
233,000 enterprises in 2009. A high number of observations can give a general and 
comprehensive picture about the growth process of firms in the context of different 
local business environments in Vietnam. In addition, the combination of time-series 
data and cross-section data allows us to apply a more in-depth methodology by 
implementing more reliable estimation methods for panel data. We employ the dynamic 
model and control for the endogeneity of firm variables. To investigate the role of the 
entrepreneur’s education and how it influences firm growth, we use the fixed effect 
estimation method. 
The empirical results in Vietnam show that higher level of the institutional factors such 
as business support service, land access, time costs, and informal charges will associate 
with higher growth rates of firms. The impacts of these institutional indicators can be 
observed in both dimensions of firm growth: employment and capital. An interesting 
finding is that the institutional factors have more significant impacts on the growth rate 
of a firm’s capital than on the growth rate of a firm’s employment.  
That there is an impact of education on firm growth is confirmed. Firms that have 
entrepreneurs with a bachelor degree experience higher labor growth rates if these firms 
operate in the agriculture or service sector. We found no significant evidence for this 
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same relationship when it comes to industrial firms. The influence of the entrepreneur’s 
education on capital growth is not so clear. The results indicate that higher levels of 
education of entrepreneurs foster the capital growth of firms if these firms operate in the 
service sector while there is no significant evidence for an education effect in the 
agriculture and industry sectors.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II will present the empirical analysis which 
describes both descriptive and econometric methods used in this paper. Section III 
analyzes the empirical results in which the roles the institutional environment and the 
entrepreneur’s education play for firm growth are highlighted. Section IV gives 
conclusions for the paper. 
4.2. Data and Methodology 
4.2.1. Data sources  
The data used in this study has been retrieved from four main sources. Firstly, the firm 
data is extracted from the annual enterprise censuses conducted by the General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam (GSO). The annual census which started in 2000 has surveyed 100% 
of incumbent state-owned, private and foreign enterprises (except those controlled by 
the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Police) in Vietnam. All enterprises in the 
survey are formally registered. The number of enterprises increased from 42,307 in 
2000 to 233,236 in 2009. The survey is led by the GSO, and the Provincial Department 
Statistics Offices (DSO) are responsible for the data collection process. Entrepreneurs 
are asked to submit a completed answer sheet of the questionnaire to the respective 
DSO. The database contains two main sources of information: a) the enterprise’s 
characteristics such as the enterprise’s name, address, type, sector and b) the 
enterprise’s structure such as the number of employees, wages, sales, R&D activities, 
environmental protection activities. More questions have been gradually added to the 
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questionnaire in recent censuses. Some information just appears in the two surveys of 
2008 and 2009 i.e. the entrepreneur’s level of education or the information about the 
firm’s technical issues. This dataset is the most comprehensive and largest source about 
entrepreneurship in Vietnam. The second source is the GSO website which provides 
data about the different provinces. The province-level dataset is collected on a yearly 
basis and published afterwards in the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam. The third source 
is the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI). The VCCI provides 
data on the different indicators describing the institutional environment surrounding 
entrepreneurship in Vietnam. These indicators are considered highly important and are 
the only measure of the institutional environment that has been compiled by official 
institutions in Vietnam. The last data source made use of is the World Bank website 
which supplies the GDP deflator of Vietnam for the study period. By means of the GDP 
deflator, we calculate the real growth rate of firm capital. 
4.2.2. The dependent variable: firm growth 
As in the studies of Dollar et al. (2005), Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006), Aterido et al. 
(2011), Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier (2007), we consider firm growth in the 
dimensions of employment growth and capital growth. Following Allen et al. (2007) 
and Nguyen and Dijk (2012) we define that the employment growth is the rate of 
difference in the number of employees between yeart and yeart-1 relative to the number 
of employees in yeart-1. The firm-level capital growth is similarly calculated using the 
position of total firm assets. We consider the real growth rate of firm capital since the 
value of total assets in the latter year (Yt) is adjusted by the GDP deflator to the 
previous year (Yt-1) before we get to the subtraction in the above fraction. 
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4.2.3. The institutional environment and firm growth 
4.2.3.1. Institutional variables 
We examine the impacts of the institutional environment on the growth rates of firms. 
Our investigation is based on a set of institutional indicators including nine different 
indicators measuring the business and institutional environment in Vietnam. These nine 
indicators comprise both, firm-level subjective and objective measures for the business 
environment to assess the economic governance on the provincial level. The aggregate 
measurement PCI (Provincial Competitiveness Index) is a weighted combination of 
these nine indicators and the PCI is regarded as the overall measurement of provincial 
governance. These institutional indicators have been developed since 2005 by 
the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (PCI, 2013). They are standardized to a ten-point 
scale and are: (i) ENTRYCOST: time cost to register, to get licenses, and perceived 
degree of difficulty to get all licenses; (ii) LANDACCESS: how easy to access land and 
the security of tenure; (iii) TRANSPARENCY: transparency and access to information 
and legal documents; (iv) TIMECOST: time waste on bureaucratic compliance and 
inspections; (v) INFORCHARGE: informal charges; (vi) PROACTIVITY: creativity 
and cleverness of provincial officials in implementing central policies; (vii) 
SUPPORTSERVICE: availability of business support; (viii) LABORTRAIN: efforts of 
provincial authorities for training and skill development; and (ix) LEGAL: private 
sector’s confidence in provincial legal institutions.39 A high score means: (a) less costs 
and charges with regard to the indicators (i), (iv), and (v), and (b): good governance 
with regard to the other indicators. 
                                                 
39 The definitions of indicators are given in Appendix C.1.  
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4.2.3.2.  Control variables 
The control variables consist of two groups: firm specifics and provincial 
characteristics. Firm-specific covariates include ownership, location, age, size, and 
capital structure. First, firm ownership is divided into public, private, and foreign firms. 
Ownership is classified, according to who is the majority shareholder: i.e. public 
enterprises are those in which more than 50% of total shares are in hands of the public 
sector. Two dummy variables (PUBLIC and PRIVATE) are used for the firm ownership 
covariate. Second, the location of a firm’s headquarter is considered the respective 
firm’s location. We separate location into three main regions: the north, the center, and 
the south of Vietnam. Two location dummies (SOUTH and NORTH) are used.  
Firm age (AGE) is included to the model to test whether the Gibrat’s LPE holds or not. 
Firm age is a numeric variable and is measured in years. We expect that AGE has 
negative impacts on firm growth.  We also include firm size (SIZE) into the model and 
SIZE is measured by the firm’s total assets and it is expected to have negative effects on 
firm growth since large firms tend to grow slower than smaller ones. The capital 
structure of firms (STRUCTURE), which is measured by the rate between total 
liabilities and total assets of a firm at the beginning of the financial year, is included. It 
is used as a proxy for internal finance and is used to test whether firm growth is 
financially constrained.   
Provincial characteristics are also supposed to have impacts on firm growth. To capture 
the provincial impacts, we concentrate on four main categories: urbanization, population 
growth, public investment and average human capital. First, the rate of people living in 
urban areas within one province (URBAN) is used to measure the urbanization-rate. 
Enterprises in regions with a relatively high urban density may experience higher 
growth rates than those enterprises operating in rural areas due to a better access to 
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input and output markets. Highly urbanized areas in Vietnam are often big cities, which 
can provide large quantities and highly differentiated production factors such as capital 
and labor. Largely urbanized areas represent a large market for a firm’s products at least 
if their outputs are consumed domestically. Most main ports are located in large cities 
and being located closely minimizes the transportation costs for firms, whose products 
are exported. As a pure population indicator may correlate with the urbanization 
variable we use the growth rate of population (POPULATION) instead. Third, firms 
may grow due to the attractiveness of the regional economic environment and the 
presence of public infrastructure. In order to capture these potentially favorable 
conditions that might be provided, we use annual public investment per capita 
(INVESTMENT) as an indicator on the provincial level to account for investment in the 
economic environment. We do not use the total annual public investment since 
provinces large in population and economic size can receive more capital from the 
central government, and the average capital can eliminate the difference in the 
provincial size. The quality of the labor force is one last important factor of the 
provincial characteristics considered here. The average number of students as a share of 
the total provincial population (STUDENT) is used as a proxy for the labor force 
quality. 
4.2.3.3. Samples 
In order to verify hypothesis 4.1, we compile the first dataset, which combines 
enterprise information from 2006 to 2009 with provincial data of the same period. The 
first dataset is a balanced panel containing a total of 37,788 firms in three main 
categories: agriculture, industry and services.  
Figure 4.1 shows the shares of firms in each sector. Agricultural firms account for 4% 
of the total number of firms but their shares of total employees and capital are much 
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higher with 44% and 41%, respectively. 41% of the firms operate in the industrial 
sector, employing 44% of total employees, and binding 32% of total assets. The total 
share of service firms is largest (50%) but the employment and capital shares are lower 
than those of agricultural and industrial firms. The above figures indicate that 
agricultural enterprises are on average larger than those firms operating in service and 
industrial sectors in both aspects: employment and capital.  
Figure 4.1: Share of firms 
 
Table 4.1: Employment growth and capital growth 
 Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 
Employment growth .100 0 0 .071 
Agriculture .061 0 0 .056 
Industry .125 -.038 0 .101 
Service .085 .000 0 .043 
Capital growth .200 -.113 .004 .256 
Agriculture .112 -.119 -.034 .117 
Industry .184 -.115 .008 .254 
Service .356 -.111 .004 .268 
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Table 4.1 reports the mean and the standard deviation of employment growth and 
capital growth across sectors. According to our sample, the average growth rate of total 
employees during the research period is 10%, which is lower than the 12% Aterido et 
al. (2011) report of. Across sectors, agricultural firms experience the lowest growth 
rates. Industrial firms grow twice as fast as agricultural firms. Firm capital grows at an 
average rate of 32.5% yearly. Service firms experience the highest growth rates (35.6% 
on average) during the period under consideration, while the capital of agriculture firms 
grows slowest, namely at a rate of 23% yearly. Both agricultural and industrial growth 
rates stay below average.  
Graphically, the employment growth rate of firms, which is presented in Figure 4.2, 
fluctuates across time and sector. At most points of time, except in 2008, employment 
growth of agricultural firms is lower than those of industrial and service firms. The 
growth trend of agricultural firms is different from those firms operating in the industry 
and service sector. While in 2008, agricultural firms experienced higher growth rates in 
employment compared to 2007, reaching the highest level (9.6%) in 4 years, the 
employment growth rate in industrial and service firms decreased by about 1% and 
3.3%, respectively. Growth trends of firm capital are identical in all sectors. Figure 4.3 
shows that there was a large slowdown in capital growth during 2008 and 2009. In 2009 
capital grew faster again. In 2008, the capital growth rate of industrial and service firms 
was at about 4% while these figures were roughly 24% in respect of industrial and 30% 
in respect of service firms in the years 2007 and 2009. One common feature is that firms 
of all sectors experienced significant lower grow rates in 2008. This may reflect the 
worldwide economic recession that started the year before.  
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Figure 4.2: Average employment growth of firms 
 
Figure 4.3: Average capital growth of firms 
 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. Most firms are 
privately owned while public and foreign firms represent only a small number of total 
firms with 6% and 7%, respectively. The ratio of debt to total assets is 0.48. However, 
the high standard deviation shows that this rate differs more extremely among firms in 
Vietnam than those in Japan (Honjo and Harada, 2006). There is a high number of firms 
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located in the south (41%). 26% of firms are located in the Center and 34% of firms are 
located in the North. 
 
Table 4.2: Variable descriptions and statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean S.D. 
Dependent variable 
Emp_growth Employment growth .100 .672 
Cap_growth Capital growth  .200 1.110 
Entreprenuer’s characteristics* 
EDU University degree gained (yes = 1) .720 .449 
AGE_ENT Age of the entreprenuer 47.234 9.097 
MALE   Gender of the entrepreneur (male =1) .791 .406 
Firm’s characteristics 
STRUCTURE Rate of total liability to total assets at the beginning of 
year 
.478 1.421 
PUBLIC Public sector holds more than 50% shares (yes = 1) .063 .244 
PRIVATE Private sector holds more than 50% shares (yes = 1) .866 .341 
FOREIGN Foreign sector holds more than 50% shares (yes = 1) .071 .257 
AGE Age of firm  8.330 6.868 
SIZE Total firm’s assets .052 .717 
NORTH Firm’s headquarter locate in the North (yes = 1) .337 .473 
CENTER Firm’s headquarter locate in the Center (yes = 1) .257 .440 
SOUTH Firm’s headquarter locate in the South (yes = 1) .406 .491 
Provincial characteristics 
URBAN Urban rate .377 .263 
POPULATION Population growth 1.444 4.178 
STUDENT Number of students per capita 39.277 45.520 
INVESTMENT Public investment per capita 82.708 93.016 
* Statistics for two years (2008 and 2009) only 
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4.2.3.4. Methodology 
The lack of empirical evidence on the determinants of successful entrepreneurship in 
low income and infant market economies motivates this study and we investigate the 
impacts of institutional factors on firm growth in such economies. We use a firm-level 
dataset within the country’s boundaries to explore the impacts of the institutional 
environment on firm growth in Vietnam.   
Most previous studies investigate the growth of firms on the basis of cross-sectional 
estimations with specifications of augmented covariates in firm characteristics. The 
cross-sectional data implies that the observed variables fully reflect the heterogeneity of 
firms, and represent factors affecting firm growth. However, firm growth can be 
affected by potentially observable variables, which are not included in the model. The 
unobserved heterogeneity can cause the coefficients to be biased. Panel data can help to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity within the analysis of firm growth (Bigsten 
and Gebreeyesus, 2006). Making use of our panel dataset, we employ the dynamic 
setting to estimate the impact the institutional environment has on firm growth by 
means of the following general specification: 
∆Yit = β∆Yit-1 +αIit+γXit + µi + uit (4.1) 
Where ∆Yit represents firm growth, (Iit) the institutional variables, Xi the control 
variables, µi unobserved and time-invariant effects, and uit the pure error term. As the 
control variables Xit compose the firm-specific covariates (Zit) and the province-specific 
covariates (Sit), the equation (4.1) can be modified as follows: 
                                 ∆Yit = β∆Yit-1 + αIit+θZit + ρSit + δi + νi + uit (4.2) 
δi are unobserved and firm-specific time-invariant effects, and νi are unobserved and 
province-specific time-invariant effects. 
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A simple OLS estimation of the equation (4.2) will yield inconsistent results since the 
endogeneity issue arises when the growth of firms (left-hand side) is a function of firm-
specific factors (δi) or of the lag of firm growth (∆Yit-1). In order to get around the 
endogeneity issue, the instrumental variable method is applied. One way to do this is the 
first difference generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which was formed in 
1991 by Arellano and Bond. This method can eliminate the unobserved firm effects by 
first differencing and employing the lagged values of all endogenous variables as 
instruments. The first difference GMM estimators are consistent only in case of no 
serial correlation of the error term. However, our dataset does not ensure the absence of 
serial correlation. We therefore use the system GMM, which was proposed by Blundell 
and Bond in 1998. In the system GMM model, lagged differences of endogenous 
variables are additionally counted as instruments in different additional moments. The 
province-level variables are more likely to be exogenous to the firm since any specific 
firm has only minor impacts on provincial averages. In addition, the existence of 
province-level variables and sector differentiation in estimations might help to control 
for macro factors which might affect institutional variables and firm growth. 
4.2.4. The entrepreneur’s human capital and firm growth 
4.2.4.1. The entrepreneur’s human capital and additional variables 
To investigate the impacts of the entrepreneur’s human capital on the growth of firms, 
we use the entrepreneur’s level of education as the proxy for the entrepreneur’s human 
capital.  The entrepreneur’s education (EDU) is measured as a dichotomous variable, 
which receives 1 if the entrepreneur has a university degree or higher (Colombo and 
Grilli, 2005; Capelleras and Rabetino, 2008; Capelleras and Hoxha, 2010). Some of the 
entrepreneur’s characteristics are added as control variables in this part. The gender of 
the entrepreneur (MALE) is added to the model and is coded 1 if the entrepreneur is 
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male. The entrepreneur’s age (AGE_ENT) is a numeric variable and measured in years 
at the survey time. Other control variables presented in the previous part are also 
included.  
4.2.4.2. Samples 
To respond to hypothesis 4.2 regarding the role of human capital, we match the first 
with the second data source. Since the data regarding the entrepreneur’s education are 
available only for the years 2008 and 2009, the balanced sheet of data contains these 
two periods only. After the matching process, the new dataset is a balanced panel with 
38,293 enterprises including 1,573 agricultural firms, 15,720 industrial firms, and 
21,018 service firms. Table 4.2 reports some entrepreneurial characteristics. The share 
of entrepreneurs that have a university degree is 72% which is higher than that in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru (Capelleras and Rabetino, 2008) or in Kosova 
(Capelleras and Hoxha, 2010). Most firms (78%) are headed by a male. This figure is 
comparable to those in other developing economies (Coad and Tamvada, 2012; 
Capelleras and Rabetino, 2008) but much higher than that in transitional and developed 
economies (Capelleras and Hoxha, 2010; Tomczyk et al., 2013). The average age of 
entrepreneurs is 47, which is equal to that in the research of Tomczyk et al. (2013) and 
is higher than those in Capelleras and Rabetino (2008) or Capelleras and Hoxha (2010). 
4.2.4.3. Methodology 
In line with the theoretical ideas of Gries and Naude (2011)40, the firm-level dataset 
allows us to examine the effects of the entrepreneur’s education on firm performance in 
Vietnam. To respond to hypothesis 4.2, we re-modify equation (4.2): 
∆Yit = βEDUit + αIit+θZit + ρSit + δi + νi + uit (4.3) 
                                                 
40
 Which states that human development will associate with a higher degree of entrepreneurial 
functioning. 
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Because of the plain of short panel data, we estimate equation (4.3) with either fixed 
effects (FE) or random effects (RE) estimators. In order to choose consistent estimators, 
the paper uses a double-check procedure for the estimation selection. The first check 
employs the Hausman test for fixed effects. Under the null hypothesis that the effects 
are random, the Hausman test will compare the coefficients of time-varying regressors. 
In the second step, we compare FE and RE estimators with the existence of cluster-
robust standard errors. The Sargan-Hansen test is used for this selection process. The 
results of these two tests lead us to select consistent estimators. In order to yield robust 
results without being confronted with the threads of heteroskedasticity, the estimations 
with cluster-robust standard errors will be applied. 
4.3. The results 
4.3.1. The institutional environment and firm growth 
In this section, the results will be presented and first we will concentrate on the response 
to hypothesis 4.1. We expect that higher scores on the institutional indicator-scale, 
which represents a more favorable institutional environment for a firm’s operations, will 
associate with higher growth rates of firms.  
Table 4.3 reports the estimations using the system GMM to identify the effects of the 
institutional environment on firm growth regarding employment and capital. The first 
three columns are for employment growth of firms in the agriculture, industry, and 
service sectors. The firm-level capital growth for each of the three sectors respectively, 
is presented in the last three columns. 
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Table 4.3: Estimation of impacts of the institutional environment on firm growth using the system GMM 
 
Employment growth Capital growth  
VARIABLES Agriculture Industry Service Agriculture Industry Service 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 1.449 0.371 -0.011 -0.943 0.920** 4.456*** 
 
(2.143) (0.327) (0.179) (0.651) (0.395) (1.514) 
Emp_growth-1 -1.337*** -0.907 -0.016    
 
(0.510) (0.720) (0.273) 
   
Cap_growth-1    
-1.233*** -1.198*** -1.105*** 
    
(0.256) (0.134) (0.123) 
ENTRYCOST 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.023 -0.023* 0.001 
  (0.027) (0.017) (0.007) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) 
LANDACCESS 0.017 0.032** 0.011 0.016 0.080*** 0.036*** 
 (0.036) (0.014) (0.007) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012) 
TRANSPARENCY -0.047 -0.030* -0.012 -0.047* -0.026** -0.019 
  (0.040) (0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) 
TIMECOST -0.010 -0.014 0.002 0.016 0.008 0.031*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.009) (0.007) 
INFORMALCHARGE 0.100*** 0.020 -0.017* 0.092** 0.038** 0.026* 
  (0.036) (0.024) (0.009) (0.040) (0.016) (0.015) 
PROACTIVITY -0.009 -0.008 0.014* -0.001 -0.034*** -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) 
SUPPORTSERVICE 0.039* 0.038** 0.010** 0.050** 0.045*** 0.017** 
  (0.023) (0.017) (0.004) (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) 
LABORTRAIN -0.022 -0.023* -0.014** -0.030 -0.030*** -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.006) (0.027) (0.011) (0.013) 
LEGAL -0.022 -0.011 -0.002 -0.012 -0.027** -0.029*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.005) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) 
STRUCTURE -0.067 0.252* 0.049 0.916* -0.205 0.322 
 
(0.342) (0.143) (0.043) (0.476) (0.171) (0.244) 
PUBLIC -3.123 0.120 0.266 -0.047 -0.441 -3.615** 
 
(2.801) (0.485) (0.257) (0.666) (0.664) (1.674) 
PRIVATE -1.526 -0.288 0.076 0.324 -0.577 -4.373*** 
 
(1.983) (0.370) (0.173) (0.672) (0.459) (1.522) 
SIZE -0.015 -0.080** 0.002 0.000 -0.121*** -0.024* 
  (0.034) (0.039) (0.002) (0.013) (0.045) (0.014) 
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AGE 
0.024 -0.017*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.017*** -0.035*** 
 
(0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
NORTH -0.083 -0.006 0.075*** 0.054 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.078) (0.022) (0.019) (0.087) (0.028) (0.027) 
SOUTH -0.267 -0.052 0.019** 0.146 -0.107 0.015 
 
(0.206) (0.062) (0.008) (0.098) (0.069) (0.031) 
URBAN -0.039 0.077 0.120*** -0.565** 0.069 -0.212* 
 
(0.421) (0.086) (0.035) (0.221) (0.070) (0.117) 
POPULATION -0.004** 0.000 0.000 -0.004* -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
STUDENT -0.001 0.000 -0.000** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
INVESTMENT 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diagnostic tests 
      
Sargan overidentification   8.09 [.15] 8.23 [.08]   2.73 [.74] 14.96 [.13] 2.27 [.52] 8.54 [.38] 
Hansen overidentification 8.09 [.15] 7.69 [.10] 7.95 [.16] 15.88 [.10] 2.18 [.54] 12.04 [.15] 
Instruments 27 26 27 32 25 30 
Observations 3,988 45,314 58,349 3,988 45,314 58,241 
Number of enterprises 1,472 15,639 20,677 1,472 15,639 20,674 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Within the process of conducting the system GMM estimations, we firstly run and 
compare various specifications based on different sets of instruments. These sets of 
instruments include all exogenous variables plus different lags of endogenous variables 
such as first lags, second lags, and third lags with and without earlier lags. Within these 
sets, the number of exogenous variables is fixed whereas the number of lagged 
endogenous instruments varies according to different estimations. On the basis of the 
Sargan and Hansen test of overidentification, the set of instruments including exogenous 
variables and earlier lags of endogenous variables passes the overidentification 
restrictions. Thus, table 4.3 presents the system GMM estimations with exogenous 
variables as well as earlier lags of endogenous variables as instruments, which can 
provide consistent and reasonable estimates of interest. Since there is evidence of an 
unequal variance of the error term, which causes heteroscedasticity, we compute all 
estimations with robust standard errors.  
Entry costs and firm growth: the entry costs seem to have no effect on the growth rate of 
firms, except for the negative impacts on the growth of firm capital in the industry 
sector. This is because the major concerns in respect to entry costs is related to the start-
up process of entrepreneurship such as the time to register, to acquire licenses as well as 
the number of licenses needed. The establishment of new branches which is part of the 
growth process of firms has also to fulfill these administrative requirements. Firms may 
have become familiar with all the procedures leading to the fact that this factor cause no 
impact. Another reason may be that there exists little difference in entry costs across 
provinces, i.e. the time to receive all necessary licenses and the number of licenses 
required depend on nationally regulated policies and are therefore uniquely adopted in 
the whole country. 
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Land access and security of tenure:  The openness of land access and the security of 
tenures seem to be important to firm growth. Easier access to land and more security of 
land tenures once land is already acquired, will result in higher growth rates of firms. 
Land and its tenures is always connected with agricultural enterprises, however we do 
not find any significant evidence for the fact that land access and land tenures influence 
the performance of these firms. One reason may be that the quality of land is more 
important than the quantity of land for agricultural firms and the growth depends on the 
investment such as increasing land fertility or applying new techniques to increase the 
land output. Industrial firms are largely affected by this factor in both areas: 
employment and capital growth. These outcomes may result from the construction 
investment such as buildings and machinery, which absorb much of firm resources. The 
ease to access land and high security of land tenure will assure industrial firms to have 
rights and possibilities for a long-term production. Land access and tenure are also 
found to have effects on capital growth of service firms. 
Transparency and access to information: the results indicate that a higher level of 
transparency will associate with lower growth rates of firms. This relationship is 
significant in respect to the employment growth of industrial firms and the capital 
growth of industrial and also agricultural firms. This indicator seems to have no 
significant impacts on the growth rate of firms operating in the service sector. The 
negative impacts may result from the fact that in active markets, new laws and policies 
have not been well communicated to specific firms. Such markets will attract and 
contain a large number of firms, which then can be overwhelmed by the local 
authority’s ability to fully cover communication with all individual firms within the 
province. The insufficient connectivity between the local authority and firms may result 
in the fact that these provinces receive lower scores at this indicator.  
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Time costs of regulatory compliance: A relatively high value of this index indicates a 
reduced waste of time for bureaucratic compliance and local inspections. The variable 
has a significant influence on capital growth of service enterprises while it does not 
impact firms in other sectors. The insignificance of this indicator when it comes to 
agricultural and industrial firms may imply that bureaucratic compliance processes are 
very similar across provinces. In addition, the frequency of inspections by local 
regulatory agencies has been regulated at the national level, thus the number of 
inspections may be comparable across all firms and all sectors. 
Informal charges: less informal charges will generally support higher growth rates of 
firms. This indicator fully supports hypothesis 4.1 regarding the capital growth of firms 
as we find positive and significant impacts across all types of firms. The results imply 
that less extra fees will promote firm growth. Our findings are similar to those of some 
previous literature (Aidis, 2005; Krasniki, 2007; Capelleras and Hoxha, 2010; Nguyen 
and Dijk, 2012). However, when it comes to the effect informal charges have on 
employment growth, we find a positive relationship.   
Proactivity of provincial leadership: The influence of proactivity on firm growth is 
rather moderate. We find that the employment growth of service firms is positively 
related to proactivity whereas proactivity impacts capital growth of industrial firms 
negatively.  
Business support services: the support services seem to be the most important 
institutional factor that promotes growth of enterprises in Vietnam. It is found that 
higher levels of business support such as trade promotion, information provision, 
business partner matchmaking, technological services as well as the quality of these 
services, will foster firm growth. So, this kind of support services can be considered 
growth incentives. Our result is supported by the study of Hansen et al. (2009), as they 
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also found that initial government assistance has positive impacts on firm growth.  This 
finding is relatively close to the matching theory of Gries and Naude (2011) as a match 
between support services, given by local government, and the business plan, ability, or 
vision of enterprises appears and this match is absorbed by the firms leading to growth 
or expansion.  
Labor and training: the results indicate that provincial efforts to promote vocational 
training and skill development for local industries relate negatively to growth rates of 
industrial firms. This variable also affects employment growth of service firms while 
there is no evidence for any influence on agricultural firms. The negative impacts on 
industrial firms may have two reasons. Firstly, more efforts of local authorities are made 
in those provinces, where the labor skills and techniques are relatively low and firms in 
these sites grow slower than those in other provinces. The second reason may be that 
although the provincial government in some cases is putting more attention to 
vocational training programs, this attention alone is not sufficient to improve the quality 
of regional workers. The lack of qualified workers can thus result in lower growth rates 
of firms compared to those in other provinces. 
Legal institutions: this subjectively perceived factor affects capital growth of industrial 
and service firms negatively. It is revealed that firms experiencing higher growth rates 
have less faith in the stability of provincial legal institutions and in the possibility that 
local institutions can be an effective way for dispute solving. The firm’s negative 
attitude towards local institutions is understandable because of the instability of legal 
regulations and laws in most developing economies. In these economies, the application 
and effectuation of laws and regulations by legal institutions may vary across provinces 
as the local authorities can use their power to (i) issue new sub-regulations that directly 
influence the business performance, (ii) intervene in the dispute resolutions, or (iii) 
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cover themselves against the appeal of an investigation of corrupt behavior. 
Entrepreneurs who made experiences of this kind or are in general skeptical of the local 
administration and its ambitions may forecast eventual adverse impacts in the future. 
Therefore, they may already prepare solutions for any negative effects resulting from 
the behavior and sanctions enforced by legal institutions, and thus their resulting losses 
may be less severe in the case of adverse selections.  
Turning to control variables, in most specifications, firm age coefficients receive 
negative values and they are statistically significant in the industry and service sector. It 
means that the Gibrat’s LPE does not hold in the case of industrial and service firms 
regarding both: employment growth and capital growth aspects. Our results find that 
older enterprises grow slower than younger ones when looking at firms active in the 
industry or service sector. This finding is supported by previous literature e.g. 
Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002), Honjo and Harada (2006), Tuan and Yoshi (2009), 
Coad and Tamada (2012), and Wang and You (2012). One common feature is that, 
except for the study by Honjo and Harada (2006), which concerns Japanese data, the 
other studies refered to also focused on developing economies such as Cote I’voire, 
India, or China. Most studies which rejected Gibrat’s Law, and therefore found positive 
relationships between firm age and firm growth, used data from developed and 
transitional economies. This may indicate how different the economic environment is in 
developing economies when comparing with more advanced economies. An economic 
boom in developing economies may create more growth opportunities for those firms, 
which are relatively new, as compared to the older firms. We find no statistical evidence 
for a firm age effect on firm growth in agricultural enterprises. Firm size is found to 
have negative impacts on growth of industrial firms. This is in accordance with most of 
the theoretical and empirical literature on firm dynamics (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 
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2002; Honjo and Harada, 2006; Capelleras and Hoxha, 2010; Mateev and Anastasov, 
2010; Park et al., 2010; Coad and Tamada, 2012, etc) since mature firms tend to grow at 
lower rates than smaller ones. This indicates the diminishing returns of size to firm 
growth. However, the impacts of size on growth of agricultural and service firms are not 
clear and statistically insignificant.  
Looking at firm characteristics, the coefficients of capital structure are positive and 
statistically significant in employment growth of industrial firms and capital growth of 
agricultural firms. These findings are consistent with the study of Honjo and Harada 
(2006), in which the capital structure was found to have impacts on firm growth and 
these impacts vary across dependent variables. Other specifications propose that the 
debt to total assets rate negatively enters the growth equations or equals zero. These 
findings were launched by the empirical study of Honorati and Mengistae (2007) as 
they used the same system GMM estimation for firm growth and generally found very 
little evidence for any impacts the capital structure may have on firm growth. Our 
results lead to the same conclusion, namely that firm growth is not financially 
constrained.  
The influence of firm ownership on firm growth is not clear, except for the capital 
growth rate of service firms. In this case, we find that public and private ownership 
influence firm growth negatively. That means firms whose majority shareholder is the 
public or private sector, grow at lower rates compared to firms with foreign majority 
shareholders. The legal ownership structure has no significant influence on firm growth 
in other specifications. Our results are partially contradicting the study of Hansen et al. 
(2009), in which household firms are found to experience lower revenue growth rates 
compared to larger sole proprietorship firms, cooperatives, and limited liability firms. 
The reason for the results may come from differences in the sample classification and in 
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the sample size. While we classify all firms on the basis of ownership, Hansen et al. 
(2009) base their classification on the formal registration of a given firm, and they also 
exclude foreign firms from the sample. The second reason for the difference in results 
may be that Hansen et al. (2009) use a much smaller sample compared to ours. The 
effects of a firm’s location on growth are statistically significant for service firms. The 
findings meet the expectation that firms in the north and the south, where the two largest 
economic centers, Hanoi and Hochiminh City are located, will experience higher 
growth rates than those in the center of Vietnam.  
Regarding the provincial characteristics, the urbanization rate coefficient is significant 
in service firms, which accordingly experience higher employment growth, but lower 
capital growth rates. Agriculture firms are found to be negatively affected by a high rate 
of urbanization, while there is no influence of urbanization found in other specifications. 
The negative impact of the urbanization rate on the growth of agriculture firms may be 
the result of the industrialization and urbanization process, which began with the 
implementation of economic reforms in 1986. Since that time, the government has 
concentrated on the industry and service sector. The reform switched the economic 
regime from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy. The reform 
has pushed the economy forward, which has been going hand in hand with an increasing 
urban population and some of these newly arising townsmen lost their cultivated shields 
to industrial enterprises.  
Population growth seems to have no impact on firm growth. Its coefficients are mostly 
statistically insignificant in all specifications. The variable used to measure public 
investment has significant and negative signs in industrial or service firms. It implies 
that firms will grow faster in provinces that have lower average public investment. In 
Vietnam, the government often calls for investment from the private and foreign sector 
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in all areas, including infrastructure (e.g. building new roads and bridges in the form of 
build-operate-transfer). Public investment is often conducted in areas where there is a 
lack of private and foreign investment such as schools, hospitals, and infrastructure in 
remote areas. Therefore, areas where private and foreign investment finds less economic 
opportunity, and thus leading to slower firm growth, may experience a higher public 
investment per capita in order to compensate for the missing private and foreign 
investment flow. The proxy for the quality of human capital, the number of students per 
capita, has strong impacts on capital growth and less influences on the employment 
growth of firms. This indicates that a higher quality of labor in the area will associate 
with higher growth rates of firm capital. The influence of labor quality on employment 
growth is not strong, as this variable is only found to impact service firms.  
In sum, the empirical results divide institutional factors into two groups. The first group 
statistically supports hypothesis 4.1 which states that higher levels on the institutional 
environment scale will associate with higher growth rates of firms. This group includes 
the factors: business support service, land access, time costs, and informal charges. The 
second group, including the factors: entry costs, transparency, proactivity, labor and 
training, and legal institutions, does not give significant evidence to support our 
hypothesis 4.1. The results also indicate that the most significant effects these factors 
provoke, are related to the capital growth, rather than the employment growth of firms.  
4.3.2. The entrepreneur’s human capital and firm growth 
Table 4.4 presents the estimations of employment and capital growth using the fixed-
effects (FE) model. The Hausman test indicates a highly and statistically significant 
difference. This leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis and thus the FE model will 
yield the more consistent estimators. The Sargan-Hansen test also strongly rejects the 
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null hypothesis of RE and we can therefore conclude that the FE models are more 
appropriate. Therefore FE estimators with cluster-robust standard errors are selected.  
The results partly confirm hypothesis 4.2, stating that the human capital development of 
the entrepreneur will associate with a higher degree of firm performance or that a higher 
level of the entrepreneur’s education will result in higher growth rates of firms. Unlike 
other studies such as those of Hansen et al. (2009), and Tuan and Yoshi (2009) which 
found no statistically significant evidence of educational effects on firm growth, our 
study finds that the entrepreneur’s education has significant impacts on firm growth in 
some cases. The positive coefficients of the entrepreneur’s education imply that 
enterprises headed by entrepreneurs with a solid educational background are more likely 
to experience growth rates above the average. Using a dummy variable, we find that the 
entrepreneur’s education has a significant influence on the employment growth of 
agricultural and service firms as well as capital growth within service firms. However, 
the entrepreneur’s education does not affect growth rates of industrial firms; neither 
employment growth, nor capital growth. The growth of agricultural firms is also 
independent from their entrepreneurs’ education. 
 
  
98 
 
Table 4.4: Estimation of impacts of the entrepreneur’s education on firm growth using fixed-effects estimations 
Employment growth Capital growth  
VARIABLES Agriculture Industry Service Agriculture Industry Service 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Constant -3.938* 1.032 0.835** -1.924 -2.299*** -2.221*** 
 (2.102) (0.766) (0.408) (1.195) (0.348) (0.471) 
ENTRYCOST 0.027 -0.100** -0.029 -0.039 -0.018 0.004 
 (0.116) (0.041) (0.031) (0.040) (0.018) (0.024) 
LANDACCESS -0.161** 0.013 0.036* -0.073** -0.013 0.007 
 (0.063) (0.026) (0.019) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013) 
TRANSPARENCY 0.273 0.079** -0.020 -0.030 0.015 0.012 
 (0.223) (0.037) (0.020) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011) 
TIMECOST 0.071 -0.012 0.015 -0.026 -0.018 0.007 
 (0.072) (0.029) (0.015) (0.039) (0.013) (0.010) 
INFORMALCHARGE -0.023 0.003 0.039 0.073* -0.010 -0.029** 
 (0.090) (0.041) (0.028) (0.041) (0.017) (0.015) 
PROACTIVITY -0.039 -0.045* -0.016 0.009 -0.004 -0.015 
 (0.127) (0.024) (0.018) (0.035) (0.012) (0.010) 
SUPPORTSERVICE -0.211 -0.054** -0.002 0.007 -0.031*** -0.017* 
 (0.154) (0.027) (0.012) (0.033) (0.011) (0.010) 
LABORTRAIN 0.355*** 0.031 -0.013 0.013 0.032* 0.017 
 (0.130) (0.038) (0.020) (0.048) (0.017) (0.014) 
LEGAL -0.189** 0.055* 0.006 0.033 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.082) (0.032) (0.022) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) 
EDUCATION  0.710** -0.049 0.093** -0.014 -0.022 0.047* 
 (0.327) (0.051) (0.037) (0.067) (0.022) (0.026) 
AGE_ENT 0.030 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.019 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) 
MALE 0.526 -0.081 -0.048 0.019 0.083** -0.542 
 (0.465) (0.144) (0.066) (0.074) (0.040) (0.533) 
STRUCTURE 0.063 0.013 0.002** 0.841*** 0.233*** 0.002 
 (0.333) (0.028) (0.001) (0.243) (0.077) (0.004) 
PUBLIC -0.234 0.155 -0.114 -0.654*** -0.094 -0.271 
 (0.364) (0.156) (0.081) (0.193) (0.098) (0.199) 
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PRIVATE 
0.030 0.075 -0.138* -0.600*** -0.086 -0.279 
 (0.285) (0.097) (0.075) (0.149) (0.094) (0.185) 
AGE 0.061 -0.021 -0.022 0.216*** 0.263*** 0.257*** 
 (0.131) (0.051) (0.028) (0.082) (0.026) (0.021) 
SIZE 0.271 -0.211 0.013 -0.987*** -0.680*** -0.018 
 (0.241) (0.143) (0.013) (0.238) (0.132) (0.034) 
URBAN 2.966 -0.316 -0.483 0.654 0.620* -0.359 
 (2.809) (0.689) (0.565) (1.999) (0.366) (0.344) 
POPULATION -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
STUDENT 0.002 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) 
INVESTMENT -0.008* -0.000 -0.001 -0.003** -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Hausman FE vs. RE 128.51 179.62 234.12 64.94 525.33 174.39 
p-value [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 86.34 73.24 163.72 504.8 229.75 n.a. 
p-value [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] n.a. 
Observations 3,130 30,561 40,070 3,130 30,561 40,070 
Number of enterprises 1,573 15,702 21,018 1,573 15,702 21,018 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.4. Conclusions 
Using a large-scale survey of all enterprises in Vietnam we investigate two hypotheses, 
drawing from the theoretical literature of Gries and Naude (2011), relating to firm 
success. Hypothesis 4.1 states that a higher level of institutional factors will lead to firm 
growth in both, employment and capital dimensions. We use a balanced panel dataset 
consisting of a sample of 37,788 enterprises, applying system GMM estimators. Our 
data comes from the yearly censuses conducted by the GSO. In order to create a 
balanced panel dataset including all required variables, our period of investigation spans 
from 2006 to 2009. To make a detailed picture of the economy, we divide enterprises 
according to their sector of operation into the three groups: agriculture, industry and 
service. Firm growth is considered in two dimensions: employment growth and capital 
growth. The results show that institutional factors such as business support service, land 
access, time costs, and informal charges empirically confirm hypothesis 4.1, saying that 
a higher level of institutional environment scores will associate with higher growth rates 
of firms. However, we find that some institutional factors such as entry costs, 
transparency, proactivity, labor and training, and legal institutions do not support this 
hypothesis. The findings indicate an interesting result, namely that the impacts of 
institutional factors are not similar between employment growth and capital growth. 
More robust results are found when it comes to the capital growth of firms.  
Within hypothesis 4.2, we examine whether the entrepreneur’s education matters for 
firm growth. For data availability reasons, we form a balanced panel dataset with a two-
year period from 2008 to 2009, including 38,293 enterprises in three sectors. Since the 
dataset is a short panel, we employ the fixed-effects model, which is proven to give 
more consistent estimates than the random effect model.  Our results indicate that 
hypothesis 4.2, saying that a higher level of the entrepreneur’s education will result in 
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higher growth rates of firms, is partially supported. The hypothesis is confirmed 
regarding employment and capital growth of service firms as well as regarding 
employment growth of agricultural firms. However, we find no significant impacts of 
the entrepreneur’s education on employment growth and capital growth of industrial 
firms, and capital growth of agricultural firms.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
This dissertation investigates household savings and capital formation in Vietnam. It 
comprises three separate empirical studies, focusing on (i) household savings and 
productive capital formation; (ii) household savings and saving mechanisms; and (iii) 
entrepreneurial capital formation, institutional environment, and human capital.  
In chapter 2, we investigate the role of the social network nexus and the insurance nexus 
in determining household savings and productive capital formation in rural Vietnam. 
We analyze the issue in two dimensions, stocks and flows, and consider the exposure to 
negative shocks. The answer to the respective research question in this part is that the 
social network nexus has more impacts in “ex ante” rather than in “ex post” households. 
In both household groups, the effects of the insurance nexus dominate over those of the 
social network nexus. In case of stocks, we also find that the precautionary view is held 
in liquid assets but not in productive assets.  
Continuing with the issue of household savings, chaper 3 investigates the impacts of the 
short-term precautionary selection and insurance on household decisions when it comes 
to the participation in saving mechanisms in rural Vietnam. The finding suggests that 
the short-term precautionary motive and insurance have impacts on household 
selections regarding different saving mechanisms. The persistence of the short-term 
precautionary motive reduces the household’s probability to deposit to formal and 
informal saving intermediaries. In addition, insurance is found to be a substitute for 
short-term precautionary savings. Refering to the contribution aspect, the short-term 
precautionary motive is found to reduce the participant’s deposits in formal saving 
intermediaries, while there is no evidence for insurance influencing on household’s 
contributions to saving intermediaries. 
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In the forth chapter, the capital formation through entrepreneurship is examined, 
focusing on physical and human capital growth. In this chapter, the institutional 
environment and the entrepreneur’s education are found to have impacts on firm growth 
in Vietnam. We find that in accordance to the theoretical literature, a higher level of 
institutional factors such as land access, time costs, informal charges, and business 
support service will promote firm growth regarding both dimensions considered: 
employment and capital. Another finding is that the impacts of institutional factors are 
more significant when it comes to the capital growth of firms. The impacts of the 
entrepreneur’s education on firm growth are analyzed and the results support the 
hypothesis that higher levels of the entrepreneur’s education will associate with higher 
growth rates of firms. 
In summary, the study has indicated determinants of savings and capital formation in 
Vietnam. Social network and insurance are found to have impacts on savings and 
productive capital formation of households. Household selections of saving mechanisms 
are affected by the short-term precautionary motive as well as by insurance. When 
considering the capital formation of entrepreneurship, we find that institutional factors 
and the human capital of entrepreneurs do affect firm performance.  
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APPENDIX 
A. Appendix for chapter 2 
Appendix A.1:  Variable definitions  
Variables Description 
Total flow ratio 
Ratio of the total flow of liquid and productive assets to the 
household’s net income  
Flow liquid asset ratio Ratio of the flow of liquid assets to the household’s net income  
Flow productive asset ratio 
Ratio of the flow of productive assets to the household’s net 
income  
Total stock ratio 
Ratio of the total stock of liquid and productive assets to 
household’s net income  
Stock liquid asset ratio Ratio of the stock of liquid assets to the household’s net income  
Stock productive asset ratio 
Ratio of the stock of productive assets to the household’s net 
income  
Household head‘s characteristics 
Gender  Households whose head is male (yes = 1) 
Edu2 
Households whose head has vocational training, or professional 
high school or junior diploma (yes = 1) 
Edu3 Household swhose head has tertiary education (yes = 1) 
Household‘s characteristics 
LnWealth Total value of all household assets, natural logarithm 
Person Number of family members 
Young rate 
Ratio of number of young people (under 15) to total number of 
household members (%)  
Old rate 
Ratio of number of old people (over 60) to total number of 
household members (%) 
Social network  
Supporter  Number of supporters (friends/relatives) outside the family  
Organization 
Households with at least one member in political/social or 
economic organizations (yes =1) 
Assistance   
Number of non-demanded visits from agricultural consultants 
(extension workers) during the previous 12 months 
Insurance  
Households with at least one member engaging in one type of 
insurance (yes = 1) 
Instruments   
Distance Distance from household to an all-weather road 
Ethnicity Households in Kinh ethnic group (yes = 1) 
Lnage  Age of household head, natural logarithm 
Lnage2 Squared natural logarithm of household head’s age 
Area1 Households loacted in Northern midlands - mountain areas and 
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former Ha Tay province* (yes = 1) 
Area2 Households located in North Central area (yes = 1) 
Area3 Households located in Central Highlands (yes = 1) 
Shock Households facing at least one shock (yes = 1) 
Household member shocks 
Households facing shocks relating to household members 
(divorce, abandonment, family disputes, illness) 
Economic/natural shocks 
Households facing economic and natural shocks (crop prices, 
unemployment, unsuccessful investment, loss of land, robbery, 
theft, floods, landslides, typhoons, storms) 
Note: Household net income is measured within previous 12 months, * Today Ha Tay province 
is part of Hanoi city  
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Appendix A.2: First-stage IV estimation for all households 
VARIABLES LnWealth LnWealth Supporter Supporter Organization Organization Insurance Insurance
Constant 3.02 3.24 -7.07*** -2.88 -1.52 -0.81 3.92*** 3.01*** 
(2.74) (2.77) (2.27) (2.24) (1.19) (1.19) (0.85) (0.84) 
Household head's characteristics 
Gender 0.27*** 0.27*** -0.09* -0.04 0.05** 0.05*** 0.004 -0.01 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Edu2 0.12 0.11 0.14** 0.03 0.06** 0.04 0.06** 0.08*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Edu3 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.05 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household's characteristics 
Person 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.04*** -0.001 -0.0004 0.01 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Young rate -0.47*** -0.46*** -0.14 -0.05 -0.19*** -0.17*** 0.09** 0.07** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Old rate -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.004 -0.08* -0.09** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Assistance 0.0006 0.0004 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.005*** -0.01*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Instruments 
Distance  8e-05*** 9e-05*** -0.0001*** -3e-05 e-05* 2e-05*** 4e-05*** 3e-05*** 
 
(e-05) (e-05) (3e-05) (2e-05) (6e-06) (5e-06) (4e-06) (3e-06) 
Lnage 4.46*** 4.33*** 4.60*** 2.19* 0.95 0.54 -1.63*** -1.10** 
 
(1.45) (1.47) (1.21) (1.19) (0.62) (0.62) (0.46) (0.45) 
Lnage2 -0.54*** -0.53*** -0.58*** -0.29* -0.11 -0.06 0.20*** 0.14** 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
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Area1 -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.38*** -0.12* 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.02 -0.04 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Area2 -0.61*** -0.61*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.11*** 0.10***
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Area3  -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.25*** 0.34*** 0.37*** -0.09*** -0.13***
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ethnicity   0.03  0.64***  0.11***  -0.14***
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Observations 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 3,227 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A.3: First-stage IV estimation for “ex ante” households 
VARIABLES LnWealth LnWealth Supporter Supporter Organization Organization Insurance Insurance
Constant -4.79 -4.57 -10.38*** -5.32 0.46 2.14 4.76*** 3.92** 
(4.34)    (4.43) (3.69) (3.70) (1.81) (1.80) (1.56) (1.58) 
Household head's characteristics 
Gender 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.05 0.07 0.05* 0.06* -0.01 -0.01 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Edu2 0.28** 0.27** 0.19** 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07** 0.09** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Edu3 0.11 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 
 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Household's characteristics 
Person 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.04** 0.00 0.01 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Young rate -0.25 -0.25 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17** -0.15** 0.06 0.05 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Old rate -0.42** -0.42** -0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Assistance 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.002 0.001 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Instruments  
Distance  0.0001*** 0.0001*** -8e-05*** -9e-06 e-05 4e-05*** 4e-05*** 3e-05*** 
 
(2e-05) (2e-05) (2e-05) (e-05) (e-05) (7e-06) (8e-07) (7e-06) 
Lnage 8.30*** 8.18*** 6.14*** 3.31* -0.05 -0.99 -2.03** -1.56* 
 
(2.30) (2.35) (1.96) (1.96) (0.94) (0.94) (0.82) (0.83) 
Lnage2 -1.02*** -1.00*** -0.76*** -0.42 0.01 0.13 0.25** 0.20* 
 
(0.30) (0.31) (0.26) (0.26) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
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Area1 -0.26*** -0.25** -0.34*** -0.16* 0.22*** 0.28*** -0.09*** -0.12*** 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Area2 -0.65*** -0.65*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.06 0.05 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Area3  -0.47*** -0.46*** -0.41*** -0.26*** 0.26*** 0.31*** -0.19*** -0.22***
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ethnicity   0.03  0.59***  0.20***  -0.10***
  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Observations      1,352       1,352     1,352      1,352    1,352     1,352      1,352       1,352 
R-squared      0.13       0.13     0.12     0.17   0.08     0.11     0.11      0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
110 
 
Appendix A.4: First-stage IV estimation for “ex post” households 
VARIABLES LnWealth LnWealth Supporter Supporter Organization Organization Insurance Insurance 
Constant 8.02** 8.19** -4.75* -1.32 -2.61* -2.32 3.42*** 2.60*** 
(3.40) (3.42) (2.87) (2.79) (1.56) (1.56) (0.95) (0.92) 
Household head's characteristics 
Gender 0.21*** 0.22*** -0.19*** -0.12** 0.04 0.04* 0.01 -0.004 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Edu2 -0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.004 0.07** 0.06** 0.06* 0.08** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Edu3 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.33 0.25 0.14*** 0.14** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.24) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Household's characteristics 
Person 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) 
Young rate -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.15 -0.03 -0.20*** -0.19*** 0.12** 0.09** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Old rate -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.08 -0.04 0.005 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Assistance -0.003 -0.004 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Instruments 
Distance  8e-05*** 8e-05*** -0.0001*** -6e-05*** 5e-06 e-05 3e-05*** 9e-06* 
 
(2e-05) (2e-05) (4e-05) (2e-05) (9e-06) (8e-06) (5e-06) (5e-06) 
Lnage 1.98 1.87 3.54** 1.50 1.50* 1.33 -1.39*** -0.90* 
 
(1.80) (1.81) (1.54) (1.50) (0.82) (0.82) (0.52) (0.50) 
Lnage2 -0.23 -0.22 -0.45** -0.21 -0.18* -0.16 0.17** 0.11* 
 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
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Area1 -0.27** -0.25** -0.44*** -0.12 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.11** 0.03 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Area2 -0.59*** -0.59*** 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.17*** 0.16***
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Area3  -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.44*** -0.25** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ethnicity   0.03  0.68***  0.06***  -0.16***
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Observations 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875 1,875 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B. Appendix for chapter 3 
Appendix B.1:  Variable definitions  
Variables Description 
Household head‘s characteristics 
Male  Households whose head is male (yes = 1) 
Primary Households whose head is illiterate or did not finish primary school 
Vocational  
Households whose head has vocational training, or professional high 
school or junior diploma (yes = 1) 
Tertiary Households whose head has tertiary education (yes = 1) 
Gov Households whose head works for the Government (yes = 1) 
Firms Households whose head works for  firms and enterprises (yes = 1) 
Private 
Households whose head works for private households/individuals 
(yes = 1) 
Self-employed 
Households whose head works as self-employed workers within their 
households 
Lnage  Age of household’s head, natural logarithm 
Household‘s characteristics 
Insurance  The number of insurance contracts that households signed and hold 
LnWealth Total value of all household assets, natural logarithm 
Person Number of family members 
Dependency  rate 
Ratio of number of young people (under 16) plus number of old 
people (over 60) to total number of household members (per cent)  
Ethnicity Households in Kinh ethnic group (yes = 1) 
North 
Households located in Northern midlands - mountain areas and 
formerly Ha Tay province* (yes = 1) 
Center Households located in North Central area (yes = 1) 
Highlands Households located in Central Highlands (yes = 1) 
South Households located in the Southern area 
Note: household net income is measured within previous 12 months, * Ha Tay province is today 
part of Hanoi city 
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Appendix B.2: Tobit regression  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Saving 
intermediaries 
Formal saving 
intermediaries 
Informal saving 
intermediaries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Household head's characteristics    
Lnage 4.09 13.24*** -1.49 
(2.51) (4.52) (3.17) 
Vocational 0.72 5.68* -3.43 
(2.15) (3.18) (3.21) 
Tertiary  -1.04 2.38 -3.24 
(3.78) (5.70) (5.32) 
Gov 2.95 2.75 2.53 
(2.44) (4.20) (3.03) 
Firm 0.70 1.67 0.50 
(3.75) (6.25) (4.51) 
Private 1.23 1.47 1.60 
(1.68) (3.07) (2.04) 
Household's characteristics    
Dependency_rate -4.83** -3.03 -7.50** 
(2.40) (3.92) (3.22) 
Person -1.21*** -2.57*** -0.41 
(0.38) (0.69) (0.48) 
LnWealth 4.64*** 7.76*** 3.10*** 
(0.76) (1.42) (0.91) 
North 0.83 18.00*** -3.04 
(1.80) (4.94) (2.00) 
Center -7.04*** 13.49*** -16.78*** 
(2.22) (5.08) (3.37) 
Highlands -6.80*** 13.54*** -15.41*** 
 (2.11) (4.93) (2.91) 
Insurance 2.24*** 3.28*** 1.94** 
 (0.67) (1.16) (0.83) 
Precautionary motive -5.00*** -4.15* -6.03*** 
 (1.31) (2.20) (1.71) 
Constant -80.79*** -181.66*** -41.52** 
 
(14.34) (29.75) (17.27) 
sigma 13.74*** 17.44*** 13.83*** 
 
(0.89) (1.73) (1.19) 
Diagnostic Tests    
Normality test, p-value 3.31E-71 8.09E-53 7.46E-57 
Homoskedasticity test, p-value 6.83E-151 8.07E-141 1.70E-117 
Observations 1,342 1,240 1,264 
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C. Appendix for chapter 4 
Appendix C.1: Definitions of institutional factors 
Variable  Full name Definition 
ENTRYCOST Entry Costs Provincial index that measures of 1) the time 
it takes a firm to register and acquire land; 2) 
the time to receive all the necessary licenses 
needed to start a business; 3) the number of 
licenses required to operate a business; and 4) 
the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all 
licenses/permits. 
LANDACCESS Land Access and 
Security of 
Tenure 
Provincial index that combines two 
dimensions of the land problems confronting 
entrepreneurs-how easy it is to access land 
and the security of tenure once land is 
acquired. 
TANSPARENCY Transparency and 
Access to 
Information 
Provincial index that measures whether or not 
firms have access to the proper planning and 
legal documents necessary to run their 
businesses, whether or not those documents 
are equitably available, whether or not new 
policies and laws are communicated to firms 
and predictably implemented, and the 
business utility of the provincial webpage. 
TIMECOST Time Costs of 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
Provincial index that measures how much 
time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance, 
as well as how often and for how long firms 
must shut their operations down for 
inspections by local regulatory agencies. This 
year, the index also includes a battery of 
indicators measuring progress on public 
administration reform (PAR). 
INFORMALCHARGE Informal charges Provincial index that measures how much 
firms pay in informal charges, how much of 
an obstacle those extra fees pose for business 
operations, whether or not payment of those 
extra fees results in expected results or 
“services,” and whether or not provincial 
officials use compliance with local 
regulations to extract rents. 
PROACTIVITY Proactivity of 
Provincial 
Leadership 
Provincial index that measures the overall 
attitude of provincial officials as well as their 
creativity and cleverness in implementing 
central policy, designing their own initiatives 
for private sector development, and working 
within sometimes unclear national regulatory 
frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of 
local private firms. 
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SUPPORTSERVICE Business Support 
Services 
Provincial index that measures the 
availability of business services, such as 
private sector trade promotion, provision of 
regulatory information to firms, business 
partner matchmaking, and technological 
services for firms; the number of private 
providers of these services; and the quality of 
these services. 
LABORTRAIN Labor and 
Training 
Provincial index that measures the efforts by 
provincial authorities to promote vocational 
training and skills development for local 
industries and to assist in the placement of 
local labor. 
LEGAL Legal Institutions  Provincial index that measures the private 
sector’s confidence in provincial legal 
institutions; whether or not firms regard 
provincial legal institutions as an effective 
vehicle for dispute resolution or as an avenue 
for lodging appeals against corrupt official 
behavior. 
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         Appendix C.2: Impacts of the entrepreneur’s education on firm growth using random-effects estimations 
Employment growth Capital growth  
VARIABLES Agriculture Industry Service Agriculture Industry Service 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Constant -0.179 0.969*** 0.228 -0.004 0.221** 0.239*** 
 (0.444) (0.274) (0.140) (0.231) (0.109) (0.089) 
ENTRYCOST -0.013 -0.085** -0.005 -0.052* -0.016 0.001 
 (0.065) (0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.014) (0.013) 
LANDACCESS -0.021 0.011 0.038*** -0.051*** 0.023*** 0.025** 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) 
TRANSPARENCY 0.160*** 0.009 -0.023** -0.037* -0.021** -0.012* 
 (0.048) (0.023) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.007) 
TIMECOST -0.019 -0.015 -0.002 0.058*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 
 (0.026) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.005) 
INFORMALCHARGE -0.044 -0.035 -0.018 0.097*** -0.055*** -0.084*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.016) (0.034) (0.013) (0.012) 
PROACTIVITY -0.088** -0.018 0.017** -0.011 -0.032*** -0.010* 
 (0.042) (0.013) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.005) 
SUPPORTSERVICE -0.170*** -0.052*** 0.007 0.054** -0.019** 0.021*** 
 (0.046) (0.018) (0.008) (0.022) (0.008) (0.007) 
LABORTRAIN 0.140** 0.026 -0.031** -0.063** 0.023** -0.021** 
 (0.064) (0.024) (0.013) (0.028) (0.012) (0.009) 
LEGAL 0.036 0.084*** 0.002 0.042* 0.025*** 0.020** 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.013) (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) 
EDUCATION  0.183* 0.028 0.026** -0.037 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.104) (0.021) (0.012) (0.029) (0.010) (0.008) 
AGE_ENT 0.001 -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
MALE 0.109*** 0.052* 0.038*** -0.043 0.057*** 0.013 
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.011) (0.029) (0.009) (0.012) 
STRUCTURE -0.051 -0.001 0.002 0.316*** 0.018 0.004 
 (0.072) (0.005) (0.001) (0.066) (0.018) (0.006) 
PUBLIC -0.034 0.059*** -0.022 0.115** 0.064*** -0.025 
 (0.067) (0.019) (0.019) (0.050) (0.012) (0.020) 
       
117 
 
 
PRIVATE 
0.270*** 0.221*** 0.133*** 0.229*** 0.163*** 0.091*** 
 (0.078) (0.018) (0.017) (0.052) (0.008) (0.023) 
AGE 0.001 -0.009*** -0.003** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.015*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.155 0.041 0.040 -0.197* -0.187*** -0.141** 
 (0.204) (0.065) (0.036) (0.113) (0.023) (0.057) 
POPULATION -0.005*** -0.000 -0.001 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
STUDENT -0.001 0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
INVESTMENT -0.001** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hausman FE vs. RE 128.51 179.62 234.12 64.94 525.33 174.39 
[p-value] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 86.34 73.24 163.72 504.8 229.75 n.a. 
[p-value] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] n.a. 
Observations 3,130 30,561 40,070 3,130 30,561 40,070 
Number of enterprises 1,573 15,702 21,018 1,573 15,702 21,018 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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